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Nova Scotia's politics have historically been defined by their tendency towards 
“tradition  and  conservatism”  (Beck,  1954;  1978).   Provincial  elections,  for  instance, 
typically had two competitors, the Liberal and Progressive Conservative parties, with a 
minimal  presence  among  third  parties.   Moreover,  as  elections  in  Nova  Scotia  are 
conducted within the confines of a plurality system, the presence of a two-party system in 
the province served as an example of Duverger's Law (1955) at work, a theory which 
claims that two-partism naturally occurs where plurality electoral systems are in place. 
Since  the  1998  general  election,  however,  Nova  Scotia  has  experienced  a  series  of 
elections  that  are  indicative  of  a  shift  towards  a  three-party  system,  as  the  New 
Democratic party (NSNDP) has emerged from its position as the perennial third party to 
form  both  the  official  opposition  and,  in  2009,  the  first  ever  NSNDP government. 
Drawing upon data found in election returns, this thesis employs measures taken from the 
political science literature, such as the effective number of parties (ENP), to explore the 
dynamics of electoral competition in Nova Scotia over the last 85 years, with particular 
emphasis  placed  on  the  performance  of  the  third  party.   The  question  driving  this 
research, namely how the historically third-place NSNDP emerged as a viable governing 
alternative to the two traditional parties, will be explored by analyzing the data herein, 
and by examining possible cleavages that created the opportunity for a third party to 
break through as a primary competitor and potential government-in-waiting, regardless of 
an electoral system that purportedly permits just two parties to thrive.
v
Acknowledgements
I would like to acknowledge and sincerely thank those who have played important 
roles in helping me achieve my goals with this  thesis.   First  of all,  I  am immensely 
thankful to my supervisor, Dr. Amanda Bittner, for her thoughtful reviews and comments 
on multiple drafts of this work, and for her unyielding patience and generosity with me as 
a graduate student.  Moreover, I would like to acknowledge the privilege afforded to me 
by the Department of Political Science at Memorial University for the funding they have 
provided over the years; the freedom they have allowed for me to pursue my research; 
and, for the flexibility and support offered by all faculty, and particularly Dr. Karlo Basta, 
Dr. Mehmet Efe Caman, and Dr. Sarah Martin, as I worked on earlier versions of this  
thesis.  As well, a special thank you goes to Tim Powers, and his late father Barney, for it 
is in the latter's memory and name that the former endowed Memorial University with an 
award in political science that I was fortunate to receive while working on this thesis.
I would also like to thank my family—especially my mother Frances; my father 
Fred; my brothers Rick, Cody, and Graidy; and my grandmothers, Fran and Virginia—for 
their love, encouragement, and support throughout my academic career, and for which I 
am eternally grateful.  Last and certainly not least, I must acknowledge and thank my 
loving partner, Cordelia McCrillis, who has been there with me through thick and thin, 
for the moments of joy and of self-doubt, always with her undying love, encouragement, 
grace, and friendship.  Suffice it to say, were it not for Dilly, I would never have been in 




Table 3.1 Properties of Rae's Fractionalization Index 54
Table 4.1 Nova Scotia Provincial General Election Results 117
Table 4.2 Effective Number of Parties in Nova Scotia 118
Table 4.3 Effective Number of Electoral Parties in Provincial Ridings 119
Table 4.4 Effective Number of Electoral Parties in Provincial Ridings (3 Eras) 119
Table 4.5 Rae's Fractionalization Index for Nova Scotia 120
Table 4.6 Sartori Count of Political Parties in Nova Scotia 121
Table 4.7 Combined Vote Share of Two Largest Parties 122





Distribution of the popular vote (%) in Nova Scotia elections since 1933 62
Figure 
4.02
Distribution of seats following Nova Scotia general elections since 1933 62
Figure 
4.03
CRA Party Preference Polling Data for Nova Scotia, 1990 – 2019 69
Figure 
4.04
CRA Leadership Preference Polling Data for Nova Scotia, 2002 – 2019 71
Figure 
4.05
Parties with seats and Sartori count of parties in Nova Scotia, 1933 – 2017 73
Figure 
4.06
Laakso-Taagepera ENEP, Mean Riding ENEP, and the Difference 77
Figure 
4.07
Golosov ENEP, Mean Riding ENEP, and the Difference 77
Figure 
4.08
Laakso-Taagepera Mean and Median Riding ENEP 80
Figure 
4.09
Golosov Mean and Median Riding ENEP 80
Figure 
4.10
Distribution of Laakso-Taagepera Riding ENEP Outcomes, 1998 – 2017 81
Figure 
4.11
Distribution of Golosov Riding ENEP Outcomes, 1998 – 2017 81
Figure 
4.12
Laakso-Taagepera Riding ENEP Outcomes, 1933 – 1993 83
Figure 
4.13
Golosov Riding ENEP Outcomes, 1933 – 1993 83
Figure 
4.14
Fractionalization of Votes and Seats in Nova Scotia, 1933 – 2017 86
Figure 
4.15
Combined Vote Share for 1st and 2nd Parties in Nova Scotia Elections 88
Figure 
4.16
Ratio of Votes for the Top Two Parties in Relation to the Third Party 89
Figure 
4.17




Distribution of seats within Cape Breton County since 1933 94
Figure 
4.19
Distribution of the popular vote (%) in Halifax County since 1933 95
Figure 
4.20
Distribution of seats within Halifax County since 1933 95
Figure 
4.21
Number of electors by county since 1933 96
ix
List of Abbreviations
CCF:  Co-operative Commonwealth Federation
CRA:  Corporate Research Associates (market research and opinion polling firm)
ENP:  Effective number of parties
ENEP:  Effective number of electoral parties (parties receiving votes)
ENPP:  Effective number of parliamentary parties (parties attaining seats in legislature)
ENS:  Elections Nova Scotia
FPTP:  First-Past-the-Post (electoral system; misnomer for SMP)
GPNS:  Green Party of Nova Scotia
LPNS:  Liberal Party of Nova Scotia
MHA:  Member of the House of Assembly (in Newfoundland and Labrador)
MLA:  Member of the Legislative Assembly
NBNDP:  New Brunswick New Democratic Party
NLNDP:  Newfoundland and Labrador New Democratic Party
NSNDP:  Nova Scotia New Democratic Party
OTH/IND:  Other parties and independent candidates
PCNS:  Progressive Conservative Association of Nova Scotia
PEI:  Prince Edward Island
SMP:  Single-member plurality (electoral system)
x
List of Appendices
Table 4.1 Nova Scotia Provincial General Election Results 117
Table 4.2 Effective Number of Parties in Nova Scotia 118
Table 4.3 Effective Number of Electoral Parties in Provincial Ridings 119
Table 4.4 Effective Number of Electoral Parties in Provincial Ridings (3 Eras) 119
Table 4.5 Rae's Fractionalization Index for Nova Scotia 120
Table 4.6 Sartori Count of Political Parties in Nova Scotia 121
Table 4.7 Combined Vote Share of Two Largest Parties 122
Table 4.8 Vote Shares and Proportion of Votes Relative to the Third Party 123
xi
Preface
The idea for this thesis had a humble beginning.  It all started prior to the Easter 
holiday in 1998, which I remember only because of the connection I can make between 
that year's general election in Nova Scotia and speckled malted milk eggs (which is an 
odd and unnecessary story to tell).  At that time, I was a 10-year-old boy growing up in 
rural Nova Scotia, and I had an insatiable interest in scholastics:  I loved to read books,  
was fascinated by geography, and was very curious about current events and the wider 
world around me.  It seems, through the benefit of hindsight, that my pursuit at a young 
age of new and exciting knowledge would inevitably lead to my interest in politics.
I was aware of elections as a child, as only a child can be aware of elections: 
every once in a while, large colourful placards would sprout upon the landscape; oddly-
friendly adults would knock at our door and chat with my parents; radio and television 
ads would appear on the airwaves—then just as quickly disappear, much to the cartoon-
loving pleasure of my brothers and I.  To be frank, as an adult, my basic perception of 
elections has changed little, only that I am now the one chatting with political visitors at 
my  door.   Still,  the  vibrant  signs  and  posters  appear  every  so  often,  and  the 
advertisements  now  appear  on  YouTube,  Facebook,  or  Twitter,  in  addition  to  the 
traditional media.  Plus ça change...
The  Nova  Scotia  provincial  general  election  of  1998 was,  for  all  intents  and 
purposes, my first real election.  It was real in the sense that, for the first time I can 
remember, I was allowed to stay up late—while eating those speckled Easter eggs—and 
watch the election returns stream in on television.  It was real in that I was made aware of 
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the basic function of an election, an awareness that was reinforced by my participation in 
a  moot  poll  at  my elementary  school,  in  what  was  a  precursor  to  the  Student  Vote 
initiatives of late.  Yet at that time, I could not fathom what exactly it was that elected 
officials did or why they would choose to run for office, nor could I really grasp just how 
important and significant the results of the 1998 general election would be, either for the 
province of Nova Scotia; for the trajectory of politics in the province in the following 
years; or, for a budding 10-year-old political nerd from Cape Breton Island.
While this thesis does not focus solely on the 1998 provincial general election, 
that year certainly serves as a critical juncture, not unlike the election years of 1933—the 
first election with widespread use of single-member ridings—or of 2009, in which the 
election  of  the  province's  first  NSNDP government  occurred,  to  name just  a  couple. 
Instead, this thesis will look at a series of 24 elections held over the course of 85 years in  
order to capture important trends and changes to electoral competition in Nova Scotia, 
and over which time the changes to partisan competition can be mapped.  In the ensuing 
pages, we will look at what the literature says about Nova Scotia (and Atlantic Canadian) 
politics and culture, party systems, and elections; we will dive into the data that emerges 
and is derived from over eight decades of provincial election returns; and, we will find 
the answers to the question of how the historically third place NSNDP emerged after 
decades in the political wilderness to become one of the province's governing parties.
1
Chapter 1:  Introduction
On June 9, 2009, voters in the province of Nova Scotia went to the polls in their  
38th general election.  For the first time, they elected a majority government composed of 
31 New Democratic Party members within the 52-seat House of Assembly.  In terms of 
elections and the legislature, little had changed in the province over the preceding or 
succeeding years.   In Nova Scotia,  for instance,  changing the electoral system or the 
electoral  calendar—by implementing  fixed  election  dates—has  virtually  no  currency 
among politicians (The Canadian Press, 2015).  Yet, the 2009 general election stands as a 
clear  example  of  something  that  seemed  nearly  impossible,  or  at  least  very  highly 
improbable,  in  the  decades  before  the  historically  third-place  NSNDP  ascended  to 
government with a secure majority of seats.
This thesis was originally envisioned as an examination of Nova Scotia's party 
system  and  its  evolution  over  time  from  its  traditional,  two-party  format  into  a 
competitive three-party configuration, but that is not really the case.  It appears quite 
clear to the lay observer that the province has a three-party system and has had one since 
at  least  the late 1990s.  Over the last  two decades,  the province's  traditional political 
parties, the Liberal and Progressive Conservative parties, as well as the NSNDP have 
formed a government, and have held the roles of official opposition and third party inside 
the House of Assembly.  Moreover, in general elections, each of the three parties has held 
their own bases of support—roughly between 20 and 25 percent of the popular vote—
while  gaining or  losing seats in  tightly contested ridings,  as  the province has  seen a 
number of close two- and three-way contests in recent years.  At present, there are no 
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indications that this political context will change in Nova Scotia any time soon.  As such, 
the original question driving this thesis—does Nova Scotia have a three-party system—
has essentially been answered with an affirmative and clear yes, as exemplified by recent 
election  results,  as  well  as  the  capacity  and  endurance  of  the  now three  governing-
oriented political parties in Nova Scotia (see also Carbert, 2016).
How did this situation come to be in Nova Scotia?  From an electoral systems 
perspective, the problem here is that the NSNDP even came to power at all considering 
how,  according  to  Duverger's  Law  (1955),  “the  simple-majority  single-ballot  system 
favours  the  two-party system” (217).   Nova Scotia  has  employed the  single-member 
plurality1 ballot since 19332, prior to which multi-member constituencies of various sizes 
were in place across the province's  18 counties.   Even as Duverger himself  adds the 
caveat that Canada is a different political animal in that it does not strictly adhere to two-
partism, drawing his inferences from comparisons of Canada with his observations of 
electoral outcomes across the United Kingdom and the United States in the 1940s and 
1950s,  he  still  returned  to  his  original  argument  that  countries  with  single-member 
plurality electoral systems tend to develop two-party configurations (1955: 220; 223).
Looking at Canada in the mid-20th century, Duverger saw a Canadian parliament 
with four parties inside it, two of which were regional parties that drew almost all of their 
support  from  the  western  provinces  of  Alberta  (in  the  case  of  Social  Credit)  and 
Saskatchewan  (with  regard  to  the  former  Co-operative  Commonwealth  Federation, 
precursor  to  the  federal  New  Democratic  Party)(1955:  223).   Notwithstanding  the 
1 Colloquially, the single-member plurality electoral system is known as first-past-the-post (FPTP), which 
is a misnomer.  Hereafter, it will be referred to as single-member plurality or SMP.
2 Between 1933 and 1981,  there  existed  at  various times a  small  number  of  multi-member  districts 
centered in Colchester, Cumberland, Inverness, Kings, Lunenburg, Pictou, and Yarmouth counties.
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national-level numbers that produced a critical mass of MPs from four political parties, 
Duverger noted the limit of the influence of the single-member plurality ballot “tends to 
the creation of a two-party system inside the individual  constituency;  but,  the parties 
opposed may be different in different areas of the country” (Ibid.)   In practice,  what 
appears nationally to be a competitive electoral landscape with several parties each able 
to  attain  effective  representation  actually  is  a  series  of  two-party  constituency-level 
competitions  with  different  actors  being  competitive  in  different  locations  across  the 
entire jurisdiction.
The politics of Nova Scotia has been analyzed and studied before, with attention 
paid particularly to the actors and institutions in operation, the political culture, and the 
history of governance in the province (see Beck, 1954; Beck, 1978; Hyson, 1999; O'Neill 
and Erickson, 2003; MacLeod, 2006; Carbert, 2016).  Provincial general elections over 
the years have also grabbed the attention of academics (Aucoin, 1972; Howell,  1979; 
Spafford,  1981;  Turnbull,  2007;  Turnbull,  2009).   Nova  Scotia's  party  system  has 
received some attention in the distant past (Beck, 1954), but this thread of literature is in 
need of updating.  In the 1950's, Beck noted the strength of the two-party system in Nova 
Scotia lay particularly in those areas where the population has “long been established,” 
which in the period he analyzes between the 1830s and the 1950s was essentially all of 
Nova Scotia outside of Cape Breton County, in addition to those localities with a strong 
trade unionist vote and “considerable foreign-born element” (1954: 528-9).  Recurrent 
themes  in  the  literature  on  Nova  Scotia  party  systems  are  the  traditionalism  and 
conservatism of the electorate and the party system (Aucoin, 1970; Beck, 1978; Hyson, 
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1973; Jenson, 1976).  Still,  these works were published at a time when the two-party 
system,  which  had  long  endured  any  possible  disruption,  was  about  to  undergo 
unforeseen changes as voters began to more seriously explore their ballot options.
More broadly, Duverger (1955) set the pace with his seminal work in the subfield 
of party systems studies, from which his  Law is derived.  Later, scholars added to this 
body of work by providing pathways for the analysis of changes within party systems 
(Wolinetz,  1988;  Wolinetz,  2006; Mair,  1997).   Moreover,  academics have developed 
quantitative  indicators  for  detecting  changes  in  partisan  competition  and  have  made 
cross-national comparisons using the same measures (Rae, 1967; Sartori 1976 [2005]; 
Laakso and Taagepera,  1979;  Pedersen,  1980;  Golosov,  2010;  Nwokora  and Pelizzo, 
2017).  While Canadian provinces have been explored by researchers (Rowat, ed., 1973; 
Bellamy, Pammett, and Rowat, eds., 1976; Robin, ed., 1978; Dunn, ed., 2016; Wesley, 
ed., 2016), including aspects of the electoral outcomes and partisan competition within, 
these studies look less specifically at  elections and party systems than they do at  the 
provinces  generally,  paying  attention  to  actors,  institutions,  and  intergovernmental 
relations, broadly speaking.  In sum, the aforementioned sources have steered clear from 
providing a detailed and measured examination of a transition from one formation of the 
party system into another within a single jurisdiction, let alone across a group of them, 
and it is this identifiable gap that this thesis aims to fill.
This thesis will look at the evolution of Nova Scotia's party system since 1933, as 
that year's general election was the first to widely employ single-member districts and 
was the first in a series of 24 general elections stretching through to 2017 for which all 
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election data—such as valid votes, rejected ballots, electors, and turnout rates—has been 
captured, retained, and publicly released by Elections Nova Scotia.  This data provides 
the baseline of information for this thesis, and it is from this data that empirical measures 
of  party system change,  like  the  effective  number  of  parties  (Laakso and Taagepera, 
1979; Golosov, 2010), are calculated.
There is a growing need for research of the type undertaken in this thesis because 
of the political and electoral changes that are occurring in Atlantic Canada, and for which 
this  thesis  could  provide  a  way  forward  for  researchers  of  the  party  systems  in 
neighbouring provinces.  Nova Scotia has had a persistent presence of third party MLAs 
in its legislature over the time period of this study, but that historical presence does not 
extend beyond the Isthmus of  Chignecto or the shores  of the Northumberland Strait. 
Indeed,  the  political  culture  of  the  Atlantic  Provinces  has  been  recognized  for  its 
conservatism, the durability of its two-party systems, and “traditional” voting for the two 
oldest parties (Bellamy, 1976; Howell,  1978; O'Neill  and Erickson, 2003).  Now that 
these traits appear to be changing across the region, it is even more important to engage 
in this research to better understand the depth and breadth of the demographic, electoral, 
and political evolution of Atlantic Canada, especially within the context of the present.
In  New  Brunswick,  third  party  MLAs  are  uncommon  but  not  unheard  of. 
Candidates from the New Democratic and the Confederation of Regions parties were 
elected in New Brunswick for the first time in 1982 and 1991, respectively, but members 
from these parties were largely unable to get re-elected.  The one exception to this trend 
was former NBNDP leader Elizabeth Weir, who held her seat for 14 years after being first 
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elected in 1991.  It would take nine years following Weir's resignation—when, in 2014, 
Green Party leader David Coon was first elected in Fredericton—until another third party 
MLA would be elected again in New Brunswick.  Across the strait in Prince Edward 
Island and prior to 2019, only three candidates who were not affiliated with either of the 
Liberal  or  Conservative  parties  had  ever been  elected  in  general  elections  to  that 
province's legislature.
Yet, even as the two traditional parties in those provinces continue to survive and 
thrive, their hegemonic positions within those provinces' party systems is currently facing 
unprecedented challenges.  In 2018, New Brunswick voters elected six MLAs from two 
third parties,  or  three each from the  aforementioned Greens  and the upstart,  populist 
People's  Alliance (Fraser,  2018;  Donkin,  2018).   In  2019, electors  on Prince Edward 
Island were faced with their first ever three-way race province-wide, as the Green Party 
there had taken the lead in a series of opinion polls over the governing Liberals and the 
opposition  Progressive  Conservatives.   Peter  Bevan-Baker,  the  leader  of  the  Island 
Greens, became only the third independent or third-party candidate to be elected in a PEI 
general election when he won his seat in the 2015 election (see Desserud, 2019).  He was 
joined by Hannah Bell in 2017, when she won a by-election for the Greens in the east end 
of Charlottetown (Fraser, 2017).  In the 66th provincial general election held on April 23, 
2019, the Green Party of PEI formed the official opposition on the strength of 30 percent 
of the vote and eight elected members, outpacing the governing Liberal party who fell to 
third-party status for the first time in its history.  That this came about in Prince Edward 
Island is even more astounding, especially when one reflects on the entirety of Island 
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political history and the durability of its two-party system.
It should not be lost on people just how unusual is the advance of third parties in 
the Maritime Provinces.  The region is known for its purported adherence to traditional 
voting patterns and aversion to third party candidates in elections (Beck, 1954; Beck, 
1978; O'Neill and Erickson, 2003), but those old habits are changing fast.  The emergence 
of a third party as a contender for government in Nova Scotia happened gradually over 
eight decades; in Prince Edward Island, by contrast, the Green Party was established only 
14 years ago and is already grasping at the reins of power.  In New Brunswick, Green and 
People's  Alliance MLAs hail  from parties that  were established barely ten years ago. 
Something is clearly changing on the ground in the Maritimes, in terms of elections and 
legislative representation, and through this thesis and its exploration of the Nova Scotia 
case,  those changes will  be explored using election data  and quantitative methods in 
political science.
The purpose of this research is to seek an explanation for these changes in partisan 
competition and legislative composition and to establish a framework for the exploration 
of the same that  can be applied to  studies  of other  provinces.   To recap,  the central 
question of this thesis is not whether Nova Scotia has a three-party system because recent 
elections have demonstrated this.  Even though the case appears to be made prima facie, 
it is still important for this to be proven convincingly with additional information and 
questioning.  Both the Liberal and Progressive Conservative parties are alive and well in 
Nova Scotia, and the transition to a period of increased competition has not hindered their 
electoral prospects all that much.  The focus here, thus, will be one the trajectory of the 
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New Democratic party, their persistent presence in the Nova Scotia House of Assembly, 
and their gradual ascent into government.  How and why did a third party—in this case,  
the NSNDP—emerge as a credible contender for power,  alongside the two traditional 
parties in Nova Scotia's plurality electoral system?  From where and from whom did they 
draw popular support?  What changes and events were occurring in Nova Scotia in the 
lead-up to the 1998 general election (and thereafter) that would create the opportunities 
necessary  for  the  third  party  to  exploit  for  electoral  gain?   To  understand  why  the 
historical third party emerged as a governing party, one must look at the NSNDP's long 
and winding road to power more so than at the performance of its two main competitors.
This thesis begins in earnest with a review of pertinent literature on the state of 
politics in Atlantic Canada, with an emphasis on Nova Scotia.  I will also delve into the 
literature  on  party  systems  and  party  system  change,  focusing  particularly  on  the 
theoretical  aspect  of  this  stream  of  publications,  as  well  as  academic  works  on 
quantitative  indicators  of  systemic  changes  to  electoral  and  partisan  competition. 
Following that, I provide an overview of the methods employed in this thesis to observe 
key political and demographic changes within Nova Scotia.  Subsequently, I review the 
results of my calculations and observations, teasing out the reasons behind the changing 
face of the Nova Scotia electorate.  Lastly, I conclude with comments on and analysis of 
the issues raised in this thesis, including discussion on the framework of this study and 
how it  could  be  applied  to  the  study of  other  places  and  could  be  expanded  into  a 
comparative study across a battery of jurisdictions.
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Chapter 2:  Literature Review
This thesis is based on the premise that three-party systems are oddities when they 
occur within single-member plurality electoral systems.  Duverger (1955) established the 
theory that “the simple-majority single-ballot system favours the two-party system,” and 
his theory has been resilient, with Duverger himself noting that his premise “approaches 
the  most  nearly  perhaps  to  a  true  sociological  law”  (217).   Duverger's  Law  has 
maintained a strong presence in the literature over the years (Benoit, 2006; Blais, 2002; 
Bowler and Lanoue, 1992; Cairns, 1968; Chezenko, 2017; Gaines, 1999; Gerring, 2005; 
Johnston and Cutler, 2009; Riker, 1982); as such, it is from this starting point that this 
thesis proceeds theoretically.
If we look, as did Duverger, at the United Kingdom and the United States, the 
theory makes sense, as both countries' two party systems date back well over a century. 
These two countries' party systems exemplify the mechanical effect of Duverger's Law, 
that being smaller parties' systematic underrepresentation in the legislature to the benefit 
of two large, dominant political parties (see also Blais, 2002; Gaines, 1999; Johnston and 
Cutler, 2009).  Moreover, there is a  psychological effect to Duverger's Law, that being 
voters' apparent aversion to voting for parties with little to no chance of winning in a 
given contest (Ibid.).  In practice, Duverger's Law works against smaller parties through 
the plurality electoral system by over-awarding legislative seats to the parties receiving 
the  most  votes;  and,  by  dissuading  potential  voters  from  voting  for  smaller  parties 
because  of  their  diminished  chances  of  attaining  legislative  representation  and/or 
electoral victory.
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Yet,  this  thesis  looks  at  Nova Scotia,  which  has  had an  enduring  three  party 
system  for  a  little  more  than  two  decades,  stemming  from  the  results  of  the  1998 
provincial  general  election  (see  also  Carbert,  2016).   However,  the  province  did  not 
undertake any major or substantive changes to its electoral system in the years preceding 
or  succeeding  1998—such  as  changing  to  a  proportional  representation  system—that 
would stimulate changes to electoral competition and give rise to new political parties. 
What is it about Nova Scotia that stimulated and fostered multi-party competition within 
the framework of plurality elections?  We will pursue this answer first by perusing the 
literature.
Duverger's Law
The  proposition  known  as  Duverger's  Law  is  a  fundamental  concept  in  the 
subfield of electoral studies, one that has spawned a multitude of papers, debates, and 
hypotheses explaining how party systems are shaped by electoral institutions (Benoit, 
2006; Blais, 2002; Bowler and Lanoue, 1992; Cairns, 1968; Chezenko, 2017; Gaines, 
1999;  Gerring,  2005;  Johnston and  Cutler,  2009;  Riker,  1982).   In  Political  Parties, 
Duverger  adroitly proposed that  “the simple-majority single-ballot  system favours the 
two-party  system,”  and  that  “this  approaches  the  most  nearly  perhaps  to  a  true 
sociological law” (1955: 217).  His confidence in declaring a law is as likely to have 
drawn the attention of scholars to the subfield as is  the seeming disjuncture between 
Duverger's  claim  and  the  political  reality  in  particular  jurisdictions.   Although  the 
correlation between the single-member plurality electoral system3 and a two-party system 
3 The single-member plurality electoral system is commonly referred to by the misnomer of 'first-past-
the-post'.
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is not always perfect, Duverger's Law is a starting point in the genesis of electoral studies  
and party systems literature, in no small part because, at its core, his law has yet to be 
fully refuted.
There is a second part to Duverger's party systems proposition, referred to as his 
“hypothesis”  (Riker,  1982;  Benoit,  2006),  wherein  he  claims  that  runoff  voting  and 
proportional  representation  are  conducive  to  multiparty  systems  (1955:  239).   This 
argument has been less forcefully stated, owing arguably to the proponent's deliberate 
ambiguity (Riker, 1982: 754) and the inability of his hypothesis “to hold for the party 
system and the electorate” writ large (Sartori, 2005: 84).  Indeed, there are cases where 
proportional and runoff systems are dominated by two large parties—Australia and New 
Zealand come to mind in this instance—along with a multitude of minor players, and 
others  where  coalition  building  is  the  norm  due  to  the  proliferation  of  small-  and 
medium-sized  parties,  such as  in  the  high fractionalized  Israeli  Knesset.   A common 
thread in the literature, however, suggests that there are more accurate explanations for 
party system development in non-plurality voting systems than the hypothesis proffered 
by Duverger.  Following from Riker, then, for the purposes of this review, in order to 
avoid any possible confusion,  and because this thesis focuses on Nova Scotia and its 
plurality electoral system, I shall focus herein solely on Duverger's 'Law'.
While Duverger's  “forceful” and “widely-cited” proposition is  undoubtedly the 
best known expression of the relationship between plurality elections and party systems 
(Ware, 1996; Benoit, 2006), Riker adds a caveat to this popular notion by pointing to 
previous iterations of the same idea, dating back as far as Droop's 1869 observation that 
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plurality  voting  leaves  the  elector  with  only  two  practical  choices  (1982:  756). 
Academics and thinkers subsequent to Droop in 1869—notably T. R. Ashworth and H. P. 
C.  Ashworth,  A.  Lawrence  Lowell,  Ramsay MacDonald,  Arthur  Holcombe,  and Carl 
Friedrich—expressed the mechanics and the outcomes of Duvergerian systems without 
expressly stating the law or claiming it as such (Riker, 1982; Benoit, 2006).  As much as 
the  product  of  electoral  studies  has  stemmed  from Duverger's  propositions,  his  was 
merely the most forceful and succinct expression of an idea that predated him by nearly a 
century—something Riker used to prove the existence of a “history” of political science, 
but which also alludes to the inherent resilience of the concept underpinning Duverger's 
Law.
The Effects of Duverger's Law:  Mechanics and Psychology
There are two factors identified by Duverger that explain how the law works in 
effect.   The  mechanical effect  is  exemplified  by  the  expectation  that,  in  plurality 
elections, the third-place party in terms of popular vote will be heavily penalized in terms 
of legislative seats won relative to the first and second parties.  Duverger notes that, in 
two-party systems, the vanquished party is always underrepresented relative to the victor, 
and  the  degree  of  under-representation  for  the  third  party  is  much  greater  than  that 
experienced by the second-place party (1955:  226).   In  operation,  the single-member 
plurality electoral system tends to over-reward the winning party, penalize the second-
place party, and marginalize third parties up to the point of exclusion from legislative 
representation.
This is not always the case, however, and it can depend upon the location of a 
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party's voters.  In the 2013 Nova Scotia provincial election, the NSNDP finished second 
in the overall  popular vote,  or about half  a percentage point ahead of the third place 
Progressive Conservatives, yet it wound up with four fewer seats than the PCNS because 
the NSNDP's popular support was more evenly spread across the province (Coffin, 2013). 
Likewise,  in  the  2019  Newfoundland  and  Labrador  provincial  election,  what  was 
anticipated to be a disastrous campaign for the NLNDP—they received only 6.3 percent 
of the popular vote, or about half the number of votes the party received in 2015, and 
only about a quarter of the number of votes received by that party in 2011—actually 
resulted in that party winning three seats on the strength of its candidates in the centre 
and east end of St. John's, and a surprise, five-vote margin of victory in Labrador West, a  
district  that  has  elected  New  Democratic  MHAs  in  the  past  (Hutchings,  2019; 
MacEachern, 2019).  This highlights a weakness in the mechanical aspect of Duverger's 
Law inasmuch as an incredibly weak party organization, such as the 2019 NLNDP, can 
overperform in terms of legislative representation by concentrating their efforts on a very 
limited number of attainable seats—after all, the NLNDP did not run candidates in 26 of 
that province's 40 electoral districts.  Focusing on a particular seat or group of seats is 
also a strategy that has been employed successfully by Green parties in British Columbia, 
New  Brunswick,  Ontario,  Prince  Edward  Island,  as  well  as  federally,  as  all  of  the 
aforementioned  Green parties  have  won legislative  representation  by first  channeling 
their efforts on the riding of the leader and getting that person elected before broadening 
their  party's  focus  in  subsequent  elections  (see  Mildenberger,  2019).   These 
idiosyncrasies, coming as they do in the Canadian context, are explored a bit further a bit 
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later on in this chapter.
The  psychological  effect of Duverger's Law is, generally speaking, synonymous 
to the concept of strategic voting in that, hypothetically, voters in a plurality system are 
less likely to vote for a third party if that vote is perceived to be a wasted one (see also 
Blais, 2002; Gaines, 1999; Johnston and Cutler, 2009).  Cox (1997) succinctly described 
the concept of strategic voting thusly:
Some voter,  whose  favourite  candidate  has  a  poor  chance  of  winning, 
notices that she has a preference between the top two candidates; she then 
rationally decides to vote for the most preferred of these two competitors 
rather than for her overall  favorite,  because the latter  vote has a much 
smaller chance of actually affecting the outcome than the former (71; see 
also Blais, et al., 2001).
The non-strategic vote is considered a wasted one because the third (or preferred) party 
does not stand a realistic chance at election, either in the local district or in great numbers 
nationally.   Strategic  voters  are  then  likely  to  cast  their  vote  in  favour  of  the  most 
palatable  of the larger  alternative parties.   Voters  have been shown to use “objective 
contextual information” like past election results and public opinion polling, in addition 
to their own personal preferences, to decide whether or not to vote strategically; however, 
the occurrence of strategic voting depends upon the individual, how attentive they are to 
current political trends, and their own interpretation of their preferred party's chances in a 
given election (Blais and Bodet, 2006).  This process takes place in voters' minds prior to 
casting a ballot, although research has shown this to be a minor phenomenon, with only 
about 3 to 6 percent of voters casting strategic votes in Canadian elections (Blais, 2002; 
Blais, et al., 2001; Blais, Young, and Turcotte, 2005).
In some instances, the psychological effect appears to have been a powerful factor 
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in the outcome of plurality elections.  The most vivid recent example would be the 2015 
Canadian federal election,  in which the Justin Trudeau-led Liberal party vaulted from 
third-party status into a strong and stable majority government overnight.  That election 
campaign was lengthy at  78 days,  and for much of the first  half  of the election,  the 
Liberals  ran  neck-and-neck  with  Stephen  Harper's  Conservatives  and  Tom Mulcair's 
NDP;  voters  ultimately coalesced around the  Trudeau Liberals  as  the  best-positioned 
vehicle for ousting the sitting Conservative government (see Grenier, 2015; Press, 2015). 
However,  as  evidence  from previous  studies  (Blais,  2002;  Blais,  et  al.,  2001;  Blais, 
Young, and Turcotte, 2005; Blais and Bodet, 2006) has shown, strategic voting does not 
occur all that often, and even in the case of the 2015 federal election, it seems doubtful 
that strategic voting will continue to exert a powerful pull on the electorate, as the context 
of the upcoming election has changed dramatically since the previous one.
Challenging Duverger's Law
The theme of the critiques of Duverger's Law has not been one of refutation but 
one of reimagination.  Riker notably revised Duverger's initial claim with the qualifier 
that  two-party competition  in  plurality  electoral  systems is  persistent  except  in  those 
places where the national third party is one of the two parties locally, and where one party 
among  several  is  “almost  always”  the  Condorcet4 winner  (1982:  761).   This  is 
exemplified somewhat by federal party system in Canada through the 1990s, as regional 
parties were elected to large blocs of seats in the House of Commons, facing off in all 
regions against the dominant federal Liberal Party.  Dobell (1986) remarks that it is the 
“absence of more than one party possessing a plausible image of being a national party” 
4 A Condorcet candidate is one “who can beat any other in a pairwise contest” (Riker, 1982: 761).
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that has contributed to the persistent presence of third parties, noting that the “central 
dominance of one national party and the weakness of the second party”—to which he is 
referring  to  the  Liberal  and  Conservative  parties,  respectively—has  created  both  the 
opportunity and the space for third parties to break through and survive in the Canadian 
party system (594-5).
Moreover, the most persistent third party presence belongs to parties of the left, as 
Dobell  states  that  it  is  the  left-leaning  parties  who  “refuse  to  negotiate  coalition 
governments... but retain the most persistent third-party representation in the legislature” 
(Ibid.).  Perhaps, by not participating in governing with another party, smaller parties are 
avoiding  existential  threats  such  as,  on  one  hand,  being  absorbed  into  the  larger 
governing coalition partner, as had happened when the Liberal Party of Saskatchewan 
was  decimated  when  most  of  its  MLAs  abandoned  the  party  to  join  the  governing 
Saskatchewan NDP after their coalition government was forged around the turn of the 
millennium (see McGrane, 2008; Rayner and Beaudry-Mellor, 2009); or, on the other 
hand, being outperformed by their larger coalition partner at the polls, as a recent British 
Columbia  by-election  illustrated  the  peril  faced  by the  Green  party  in  that  province 
(Chan, 2019; Smyth, 2019).
Cox (1997) recognizes  the tendency in  Canadian elections  for  third  parties  to 
persist in particular regions, noting that “Duverger's Law holds only if the social cleavage 
structure is not characterized by geographically concentrated minorities who might form 
the basis of a successful, albeit localized, third party” (24-25).  Still, the idea persists here 
that,  at  the riding level,  only two parties are in competition,  which some researchers 
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(Gaines, 1999) suggest is not necessarily the case at all.
On the other hand, Colomer (2005) challenges us to reverse the order, arguing that 
is it  the number of parties that determines the choice of electoral system.  That party 
configuration influences electoral system choice is a common refrain among Duverger's 
dissenters (Benoit, 2007: 368).  Colomer points out that a small number of parties or a 
minimal number of social cleavages ultimately leads to a majoritarian, two-party system. 
Similarly, multiparty systems had developed before the adoption of proportional electoral 
systems.  Colomer argues that this indicates the party system is a causal factor in the 
change of  electoral  rules.   Moreover,  elections  immediately after  the adoption of  PR 
systems have confirmed the previously existing multiparty configuration, a phenomenon 
that Duverger himself acknowledged (Colomer, 2005: 18; Benoit, 2007: 365).  That said, 
all federal and provincial elections in Canada are currently held within the framework of 
a  SMP electoral  system,  after  recent  efforts  to  change  the  electoral  system in  some 
jurisdictions having failed.  Finally, Colomer observes that the effective number of parties 
increases over the long term, electoral system notwithstanding.
Cairns (1968) would suggest instead that the electoral system exerts the strongest 
force on the evolution of the party system in Canada.  He pointed out that the plurality 
electoral system in Canada had put in a “mediocre” performance in the mid-20th century\ 
when it is measured by its ability to create “artificial legislative majorities to produce 
cabinet stability,” noting that, of the 14 elections at the federal level between 1921 and 
1965, only eight produced a majority government, two of which were thin majorities of 
52 percent or less of the seats in the House of Commons (Cairns, 1968: 56).  Moreover, 
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Cairns notes that “minor parties with sectional strongholds” perform fairly well within 
the context of a plurality electoral system, as opposed to parties whose support is less 
concentrated and spread more thinly (Ibid.: 59), a phenomenon that has been observed at 
the federal level in years past through the resiliency of the parliamentary presence of the 
Bloc  Québécois,  the  Cooperative  Commonwealth  Federation,  the  Reform  party,  and 
Social Credit at various points in time.
Another major critique of Duverger's Law is the persistence of exceptional cases, 
particularly  those  of  Canada  and  India,  which  is  discussed  in  further  detail  below. 
Douglas Rae offered a reformulation of Duverger's Law that suggested plurality elections 
are “always associated with two-party competition except where strong local minorities 
exist”  (as  cited  in  Riker,  1982:  760).   Chhibber  and  Kollman  show  that  multiparty 
competition persists over time in Canada and India to an extent unobserved in the United 
Kingdom or the United States (2004: 167-8).  As we will see later, the persistence of the 
Canadian  exception,  like  that  of  India,  is  based  on  explanations  highlighting  the 
influences of federalism and regionalism on the party system.
However, the most forceful critique comes from Dunleavy (2012), who suggested 
that “Duverger's Law is extinct,” “has ceased to be,” and “is a dead parrot,” alluding to a 
famous  Monty  Python  sketch.   In  his  analysis,  Dunleavy  demonstrates  clearly  that 
elections to the American House of Representatives, using the 2006 midterm elections as 
an example, adhere “completely” to Duvergerian expectations; whereas, in the other two 
cases he explores—India's 2004 Lok Sabha elections and the 2005 general election in the 
United Kingdom—show quite different outcomes relative to their American counterparts, 
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with UK elections having some areas of two-party dominance but others where liberal 
and  nationalist  parties  break  through,  and  in  India,  wherein  there  are  district-level 
contests in which the two main parties there are not even in contention (Ibid.)  Dunleavy 
ultimately argues that expressions of Duverger's Law in practice can scarcely be found 
“outside the USA, except for a few small Caribbean nations,” adding that “all the major 
Westminster  system countries [which Dunleavy identifies as Australia,  Canada,  India, 
New  Zealand,  and  the  United  Kingdom]  have  shown  strong  trends  towards  multi-
partism” (Ibid.).   Of the  aforementioned Westminster  system countries,  only Canada, 
India, and the United Kingdom have a SMP electoral system.  While this thesis does not 
go so far as to dismiss Duverger's Law as deceased, it certainly challenges the notion that  
the 'law' holds for a Canadian province, even at the district or riding level, adding instead 
to  the  notion  that  Canada  is  an  exceptional  case—indeed  a  problematic  one—when 
analyzed through a Duvergerian lens.
Duverger's Law and Canadian Exceptionalism
The  main  thrust  of  the  relevant  literature  pertaining  to  Duverger's  Law  and 
elections  in  Canada  is  that  this  country  is  exceptional.   This  idea  of  Canadian 
exceptionalism  is  as  old  as  Duverger's  Law  itself—really.   Duverger  mentions  how 
Canada does not neatly conform with his eponymous law in  Political Parties  (1955), 
wherein he writes, notwithstanding the presence of four parties in the House5, Canada's 
pluralistic  parliamentary  politics  still  displays  “a  fairly  obvious  tendency  towards 
dualism” (223).  He appears to rationalize the presence of the two smaller parties—at the 
5 Duverger's book, Political Parties, was originally published in 1951.  He wrote about the membership 
of the Canadian House of Commons at that particular point in time, most of whom would have been 
elected at the 1949 general election.
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time, the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation and Social  Credit—as the effect of 
regionalism at  the national  level,  noting that  the CCF is  “almost entirely confined to 
Saskatchewan, where it [held] the government [at the time]” and that Social Credit was 
“a purely local party with no representation outside the Province of Alberta  where it 
replaced the United Farmer's party” (Ibid.).  In other words, Canada, per Duverger, is not 
much  of  an  exception  after  all,  when  you  discount  the  presence  of  regionally-based 
political parties.  Even if Canada has a national legislature with multiple political parties 
attaining representation, the single-member plurality ballot still “tends to the creation of a 
two-party system inside  the  individual  constituency;  but  the  parties  opposed may be 
different in different areas of the country” (Ibid.; see also Park, 2003).
A problem arises  with this  line of  reasoning is  when data  refutes its  premise. 
While some researchers hold that, at the riding level, Canada confirms to Duvergerian 
expectations  of  two-party  competition  (Duverger,  1955;  Park,  2003),  others  are  less 
convinced, stating that Canadian constituencies typically range between two- and four-
party competition and that “sectional insurgency” can spawn regionally-based political 
movements  that  are  electorally  successful  (Gaines,  1999;  Johnston and Cutler,  2009; 
Johnston, 2013).  Indeed, it has been recognized for some time that the “electoral system 
positively favours minor parties with sectional strongholds and discourages minor parties 
with diffuse support” (Cairns, 1968: 59), which is why, on one hand, the Bloc Québécois
—with  its  support  rooted  among  Quebec  separatists  and  nationalists,  who  are 
geographically concentrated in vote-rich francophone Quebec—maintained a substantive 
parliamentary presence over  two decades,  whereas  the Green Party—an entity which 
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predates the Bloc by nearly a decade, and which espouses ecological positions on policy 
matters—has struggled to  attain a  foothold in  any Canadian  legislature  until  recently 
because of a lack of geographically concentrated groups of environmentally conscious 
voters.  To speak idiomatically, parties spread a mile wide and an inch thick are not likely 
to  attain  legislative  representation,  as  opposed  to  parties  whose  support  is  highly 
concentrated in a particular locale.
Even when sectionality is factored in, there is still the possibility that multiple 
candidates and parties can break through in a given riding, which may result in several 
candidates attaining a not-insignificant level of support, ultimately creating a competitive 
multipartisan climate at the riding level.  Chhibber and Kollman (2004) provide evidence 
of the phenomenon of national multipartism and district two-partism across four federal 
countries, yet even here they find that Canadian constituencies show an effective number 
of parties (or ENP) greater than 2 and a similar accelerating trend line to that of India, a 
country whose population is both many times greater, and more demographically diverse, 
than that of Canada.  Indeed, as one study points out, Canadian ridings generally “do not 
seem to move toward bipartisan [or Duvergerian] competition over time” (Gaines, 1999: 
850).   For  example,  during  the  2015 federal  election  in  the  Quebec  riding  of  Saint-
Hyacinthe—Bagot , the New Democratic candidate ultimately won the seat with a mere 
28.7 percent of the vote, with only 12 percentage points separating her from her fourth-
place  Conservative  challenger  (Schwartz,  2015).   With  the  right  mix  of  candidates, 
typically drawn from the ranks of municipal and provincial politics in addition to those 
candidates  who have run multiple  times before,  riding-level  races across  Canada can 
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become competitive three-, four-, and even five-way races.  Moreover, with the rise in 
popularity  of  historically  small  parties  like  the  federal  Green  and  People's  parties, 
fractionalized competition at the riding level—at least federally—is more than likely to 
increase.
So,  what  accounts  for  Canada's  perpetual  exception to  the Duvergerian norm? 
Regional voting patterns recur as a theme, with entrenched “traditional” voting habits, the 
salience of provincial political issues and their “contamination” of federal politics, and 
variations  in  party  competitiveness  being  the  primary  factors  influencing  the 
fractionalization of the federal party system (Gaines, 1999; O'Neill and Erickson, 2003; 
Johnston and Cutler, 2009).  However, others view regionalism as proof of localized two-
party systems with variations on the parties at play (Taagepera and Grofman, 1985: 342; 
see also Duverger, 1955: 218; Gaines, 1999: 842).  Scant evidence has been provided that 
class or cultural cleavages have exerted as strong an influence as regionalism.  Even for 
an obvious case such as Quebec, its influence on the federal party system is generally 
considered no different than any other region, and for that matter it is comparable to the 
western  provinces  in  its  historical  receptiveness  to  third  parties.   By  and  large,  the 
consensus in the literature is that regionalism and regional differences have the largest 
influence on the federal party system.
Canadian Provincial Politics
Canadian  party systems  literature  flourished  in  the  1960s  and 1970s  with  the 
publication  of  detailed  qualitative  analyses  of  the  state  of  partisan  competition, 
contemporary electoral trends, and expectations in provincial general elections.  Coming 
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as it did at a time when Canada hewed closer to a two-party norm and prior to the advent 
of indicators of partisan competition,  many of the claims and assumptions within the 
literature are blind to more recent trends in Canadian politics.  Moreover, it also appears 
that Canada is inordinately exceptional in the sense that its party systems, at the federal 
and provincial levels, have regularly veered away from Duvergerian expectations.  This 
phenomenon could be better understood by applying underemployed methods to analyze 
Canadian provincial party systems, especially in case studies at the provincial level.
Canada's political arenas are diverse and ripe for study.  Thus far, much that has 
been explored in the literature about Canada has had to do with the federal party system, 
yet Canada's provinces and territories are smaller versions of the same electoral processes 
and party dynamics.  Stewart, Sayers, and Carty (2016) provide a brief update to works 
issued decades earlier that explored the party systems of the provinces.  Their analysis 
shows that Duverger's Law is alive and well at the provincial level, with most provinces 
having a  firm two-party system in place  with variations  in  the  ordering  of  the party 
constellation (2016: 144-7).  Even then, recent elections in the provinces have pushed 
back against the narrative that the provinces exhibit Duvergerian norms.
One  model  for  a  detailed  analysis  of  provincial  party  systems  is  found  in 
Canadian Provincial Politics: The Party Systems of the Ten Provinces, edited by Martin 
Robin  (1972),  which  provides  a  thorough qualitative  analysis  of  the  provincial  party 
systems, reviewing historical events, elections, and social trends in each one.  Though 
this appears before the advent of 'effective'  party indicators, it  nonetheless provides a 
comprehensive overview of the party systems and political cultures of the provinces up to 
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the early 1970s.  Similar edited books (Rowat,  1973; Bellamy, et  al.,  1976) emerged 
around this time, providing a greater description and analysis of provincial government 
and politics on the whole than anything previous.  Though none delves as deeply into 
provincial  party systems  as  Robin's  edited  book,  space  is  still  dedicated  to  updating 
previous analyses of party systems.  Taken altogether, these three books are the most 
prominent of the foundational texts on Canadian provincial party systems.
Moreover,  Provinces,  a  compilation  of  essays  and  studies  edited  by  the  late 
Christopher Dunn; a recent edition of the Canadian Political Science Review, dedicated 
to provincial studies; and, Big Worlds: Politics and Elections in the Canadian Provinces  
and Territories, are recent publications that have rejuvenated the study of the provinces 
with new and updated research, something that this subsection of Canadian politics has 
been sorely lacking since a  surge of  provincial  politics literature was released in the 
1960s and 1970s (Wesley, 2015: 2-3).  Still, these latest entries reserve only a small space 
for  elections  and  party  systems  analysis,  focusing  more  broadly  on  issues  of 
demographics,  the  structures  and  processes  of  provincial  governments,  and  pertinent 
policy issues.
In the decades since the initial provincial studies publications were released, there 
had been little apparent interest in provincial party systems.  Wesley noted this gap and 
the  problems  it  poses,  especially  since  the  literature  on  some  aspects  of  Canadian 
provincial politics “is now so dated that any generalizations are becoming dangerous” 
(2015:  3).   The  recent  additions  to  the body of  literature  on provincial  politics  have 
ignited hopes that there will be renewed interest in this subsection of Canadian politics—
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as evidenced, in part, by this thesis—and that the flow of publications, particularly on 
provincial electoral and party systems, will start to increase.
Generally speaking, however, provincial politics has historically been given short 
shrift, overlooked by scholars of Canadian politics who tend to favour the bigger issues 
encountered at the national and international levels.  There are several reasons why this is 
perilous.  For starters,  Canadian provinces are very powerful subnational entities in a 
decentralized federal  state,  and provincial  constitutional  responsibilities  are  becoming 
much  more  important  and  salient  with  people  in  modern  society.   How  provincial 
institutions  cope  with  these  challenges  has  implications  for  students  interested  in 
federalism and comparative politics. On provincial  party systems, the assumption that 
two-partism is the norm across the board is ripe for rebuttal.  If, for instance, the ENP 
naturally trends upward over time (Colomer, 2005; see also Gaines, 1999), it only makes 
sense  that  we are  now seeing the  presence  in  most  provincial  legislatures  of  elected 
members from three or more political parties—only in Alberta and Saskatchewan are the 
legislatures  presently bipartisan.   Finally,  there is  a renewed sense of momentum for 
provincial studies literature with an uptick in new publications drawing the attention and 
interest  of  scholars.   It  is  important  that  we  seize  on  this  newfound  momentum by 
adapting theories and approaches from elsewhere in political science to the problems and 
puzzles of provincial  politics, thereby fashioning a modern and more robust genre of 
provincial studies.
Politics of Nova Scotia
Turning one's attention specifically to Nova Scotia, one sees that the dominant 
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themes  in  much  of  the  literature  are  the  province's  tendency  towards  tradition  and 
conservatism, and as it pertains to the latter, the emphasis is less on political conservatism 
than on cultural stasis.  Beck is foremost among the authors here, as his works set the 
pace for the study of Nova Scotia politics, coming as they did during the 1950s through 
the 1970s, at a time of heightened interest in publications on provincial-level politics and 
culture.  Beck remarked on the province's historically traditional voting patterns, wherein 
“whole families maintain with a sort of proud tradition an unbroken history as partisans 
for generations” (Langley, as cited in Beck, 1954: 519).  Put another way, voters would 
be  inclined—perhaps  even  pressured—to  vote  in  the  same  way  as  their  forebears, 
typically for either the Liberal or Conservative parties.
Traditional voting was tied, in the case of Nova Scotia, to the province's “static” 
nature, having experienced “few disturbances of its socio-economic, religious, racial, or 
ethnic composition,” having been “[s]ettled largely by British and Loyalist stock,” in the 
years prior to Confederation through to the 1970s (Aucoin, 1972: 25; Norman, 1973: 19; 
see  also  Beck,  1978).   Some  segments  of  Nova  Scotia  society  have  described  their 
traditional  voting habits  as a form of “secularized religion,” with partisan allegiances 
considered “an integral part of one's identity” and their party identification “remain[ing] 
with  them  for  life”  (Bellamy,  1976:  13).   While  traditional  voting  habits  were  not 
universal to all Nova Scotians, they were well enough engrained to be documented as a 
recurring feature of Atlantic Canadian political culture through much of the 19 th and 20th 
centuries.
Casting one's eye on demographics reveals that the province's “static” nature has 
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held up relative to changes that have been seen elsewhere in Canada.  As of the 2016 
Census, fully 93.5 percent of Nova Scotia (versus 77.7 percent of all Canadians) do not 
consider  themselves  to  be  a  visible  minority,  and  another  84.6  percent  of  Census 
respondents from the province (compared to 58.4 percent of all respondents) have stated 
that their “generation status”—having both parents born within Canada—goes back three 
or more generations, which indicates that the demographic composition of the province 
still  has  not  changed all  that  much from what  was  observed in  the  1970s  (Statistics 
Canada, 2017).  Even groups whose presence reached a critical mass in Nova Scotia prior 
to Confederation—those being Aboriginals of First Nations, Inuit, and Métis ancestry; 
French-speaking Acadians; and, African Nova Scotians—remain small minorities, with 
individuals identifying as members of these groups totaling 8.2 percent, 2.6 percent, and 
2.4  percent  of  the  overall  population  of  Nova  Scotia,  respectively  (Ibid.).   In  sum, 
present-day Nova Scotia does not appear that differently than it did in the 1970s—or even 
the 1870s—although it is, to a degree, less ethnically homogenous than it used to be.
In  terms  of  the  party  systems  across  Atlantic  Canada,  and  in  Nova  Scotia 
particularly, up to the 1970s, the enduring patterns of competition were “relatively old, 
being formed during the late 1800s” in the period following Confederation, and having 
“escaped  major  socio-economic  upheavals”  nor  having  been  “faced  with  large-scale 
immigration,” the region's politics grew to be dominated by oscillations between periods 
of  Liberal  and  Conservative  rule,  with  those  parties  avoiding  hardened  ideological 
divisions by practicing brokerage politics in order “to appeal to all segments of [Nova 
Scotian] society” (Hyson, 1973: 480-82).  Neither of the two old parties had overly strong 
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ideological leanings, with one author describing partisan competition in Nova Scotia as 
akin  to  “contests  between the  'ins'  and the  'outs'”  (Aucoin,  1972:  25),  while  another 
remarked at  how “the Liberals  and the  Conservatives  are  pragmatic  parties  that  take 
stands on specific issues more on grounds of expediency than principle” (Beck, 1978: 
179).   Indeed,  whereas  in  the  first  half  of  the  20 th century,  both  parties  would have 
“emphasize[d]...  that  too  much  can  be  expected  of  governments  and  that  paternal 
legislation is not the remedy for economic and political ills” (Beck, 1954: 519), later 
governments  of  both  parties  took  an  outright  interventionist  approach  to  economic, 
industrial, and social development (see Beck, 1978; O'Neill and Erickson, 2003).  On the 
whole,  “no basic  issue  distinguishes  the  [political]  parties,  and  politics  continues  in 
response to preference patterns on short-run issues, within the context of traditional and 
strong party affiliations” through a persistent party system “that has not changed greatly 
since the 19th century when the lines of support were drawn” (Jenson, 1976: 129).
The concept of traditionalism and traditional voting is nothing new in the annals 
of Atlantic Canadian and Nova Scotian political literature (Aucoin, 1972; Beck, 1954; 
Beck, 1978; Bellamy, 1976; Howell, 1978; Jenson, 1976; Kenny, 1999; Norman, 1973; 
O'Neill and Erickson, 2003; Rowat, 1973), but both are concepts that are perhaps less 
applicable  to  Nova  Scotia  and  its  neighbours  presently  than  it  had  been  in  the  past 
(Carbert, 2016; see also Kenny, 1999; O'Neill and Erickson, 2003).  First of all, in the 
literature on the party system and electoral competition in Nova Scotia—and as with 
Duverger's Law—one clear exception is noted, and that is Cape Breton County and its 
consistent support of Labour, CCF and NDP candidates (Beck, 1954: 528-9;  Beck, 1976: 
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178; Beck, 1978: 183; Bellamy, 1976: 14; Carbert, 2016: 48; Clutterbuck, 1973: 458-60; 
Hyson, 1973: 480-82; Norman, 1973: 20).  Throughout the 20 th century,  Cape Breton 
County was an base of industry, as it was home to multiple coal mines and a large steel 
plant,  in  addition  to  traditional  resource  extraction  in  the  fisheries,  forestry,  and 
agricultural sectors.  In the collieries especially, organized labour was active and present, 
and it was the coal miners' union that ultimately spurred the establishment of the Nova 
Scotia wing of the CCF in the late 1930s (Beck, 1954: 528; Beck, 1978: 182-3; see also 
Earle and Gamberg, 1989).  Whereas earlier attempts to harness the political power of 
agrarians  and unionists  across Nova Scotia had borne fruit  with the success of some 
Farmer-Labour  candidates  shortly after  the  First  World  War,  the cohesiveness  of  that 
political alliance proved ephemeral as both camps experienced difficulties cooperating 
and coordinating their political activities, and their elected members proved ineffectual, 
leading to the reassertion of the traditional, two-party system by the time of the 1925 
provincial election (Ibid.).  However, in the years following a by-election victory in 1939
—and  with  the  exception  of  two  terms  in  the  1960s—the  CCF  and  NSNDP have 
maintained a continuous presence in the Nova Scotia House of Assembly, with all of their 
members prior to 1981 being elected from constituencies in Cape Breton County.
What the pre-1980s literature on Nova Scotia fails to capture is the gradual rise in 
NSNDP support and, moreover, the shift in that party's base of support from its industrial, 
unionist base in Cape Breton County, towards the diverse, highly-educated, metropolitan 
voters situated in Halifax County.  It is obvious as to why authors up to the 1970s could 
not detect the shift in NSNDP electoral support out of Cape Breton County, and that is 
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because the NSNDP was not electing members in any of the province's other 17 counties, 
and the party's popular vote in those counties was not reaching a point where electing 
MLAs seemed a realistic proposition.  More to the point, there was no data to analyze, 
such as election returns, as it was only in the 1980s that NSNDP support outside Cape 
Breton began to reach a critical mass.
Indeed, it was only in 1980 when Alexa McDonough was elected the first NSNDP 
leader based outside Cape Breton, and the first woman to lead a major political party in 
Canada (McDonough, 2006; Smith and Guildford, 2011; Carbert, 2016).  In 1981, during 
her first election as party leader, McDonough was the only NSNDP candidate to win a 
seat,  and  she  did  so  in  a  Halifax  area  riding  (Smith  and Turnbull,  2008;  Smith  and 
Guildford, 2011).  In the same election, the McDonough-led NSNDP failed to retain any 
of the four seats the party had won in Cape Breton County in 1978, and it would be 
another 16 years before another NSNDP candidate would be elected there, in the form of 
Helen MacDonald in a 1997 by-election (see Swick, 1997).
That  a  party like  the  NSNDP,  especially  one  that  had  been so  culturally  and 
geographically entrenched in a specific region of the province, could, with the election of 
a particular leader,  shift  its  audience and base so suddenly is  a stark example of the 
importance of leaders within the framework of parliamentary politics (see Bittner, 2010; 
Bittner, 2018; Stewart and Carty, 1993).  To be clear, Bittner does not argue that there is 
an increasing “presidentialization” or leader-centric focus in Canadian elections; rather, 
she posits that leaders “are important and continue to play an important role in the minds 
of voters” (Bittner, 2018: 297-8.)  Her research has shown that, in Canadian elections, 
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voters' evaluations of the leaders' traits are “an important factor incorporated into vote 
choice”; that the leaders' character is more important than their competence in influencing 
vote  choice;  and,  that  leaders'  traits  are  evaluated  relative  to  those  of  their  fellow 
competitors (Bittner, 2010: 200).  Others have found, however, that changing the party 
leader “provide[s] no observable general boost in partisan support at the polls,” and as for 
non-governing parties, while they “usually see their vote and seat shares increase after a 
leadership change, these changes are typically very small” (Stewart and Carty, 1993: 318; 
329).
Still,  if  “leaders have always mattered” in Canadian politics, as Bittner (2018) 
suggests, than this is no less true in Nova Scotia, where Alexa McDonough's impact on 
provincial politics continues to reverberate, especially in the reorientation of the NSNDP 
from the party of Cape Breton labour to a party of urban professionals and social activists 
(see Carbert, 2016).  While, as Stewart and Carty (1993) might have expected, there was 
no immediate boost in party fortunes in the election following McDonough's ascension to 
the party leadership—the NSNDP lost its four seats in Cape Breton, McDonough won the 
party's first seat outside the island, and the party's vote rose by four percent—it is clear in 
hindsight that McDonough's reorientation of the NSNDP gradually led to a change in the 
party  system,  from the  traditional,  two-party  format  it  had  had  since  Confederation 
(Beck, 1954; Beck, 1978) towards a competitive, three-party system (Carbert, 2016: 46; 
see also Chezenko, 2017).  Compared to its political history, little has been written about 
the present state of multiparty competition in Nova Scotia, a gap which this thesis intends 
to address and one which will be discussed further at the end of this chapter.
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Measuring Partisan Competition:  The Effective Number of Parties
Devising indicators as a means of comparing party systems has spawned a robust 
stream of its  own literature.   The catalyst  for this  line of work were questions as to 
whether or not a large number of parties is destabilizing to a political system.  Simply 
counting the number of extant parties would tell us nothing other than the number of 
political parties, and it would provide no insight as to the viability of these entities or 
their likelihood of electoral success.  Election results provide a snapshot of party support 
at a given time, and there exists a multitude of qualitative explanations for changes in 
party support between elections.  There was thus a need to come up with an objective 
indicator of relative party strength.
An important  milestone  in  this  stream of  literature  is  Laakso and Taagepera's 
“'Effective' Number of Parties,” wherein they identify the “need for a number that takes 
into account [a party's] relative size” (1979: 3).  Their measure is expressed as N = 1/Σpi2, 
where pi is the fractional share of the i-th component (1979: 24).  Typically, the effective 
number of parties is lower than the number of parties in competition, as this measure 
indicates the relative strength of parties in a system, unless parties are near parity in their 
levels of support.  Presently, Laakso and Taagepera's effective number of parties (ENP) as 
originally devised remains an important  indicator  of  relative party strength,  and their 
work ought to be considered the starting point for comparative and quantitative analysis 
of party systems.
Laakso and Taagepera also note in their original work that the ENP measure can 
and should be applied to both the number of votes that parties receive as well as the 
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number of legislative seats that parties win.  Whereas analyzing vote totals will provide 
guidance  as  to  the  relative  size  of  parties  and  voting  blocs  among  the  electorate, 
analyzing seat counts provides a more conservative and succinct measure of the relative 
size of 'effective' parties, understood here to mean parties with a reasonable likelihood of 
attaining some power through the receipt of legislative representation.
In pursuit of ENP, it is important to know where one should look to determine this 
number.  Laakso and Taagepera (1979) initially applied the ENP measure to national-
level vote shares in western European countries, which then provided insight into the 
number of parties in competition at a given election, as well as a comparative measure of 
party systems across national cases.  Chhibber and Kollman (2004) notably employ ENP 
in this fashion in their comparative analysis of national party systems in federal states., 
and  other  researchers  have  employed  ENP in  a  similar  fashion  in  order  to  compare 
different polities and to analyze one polity over time (see Gaines, 1997; Gaines, 1999; 
Johnston and Cutler, 2009; Johnston, 2013; Park, 2003).
Some have suggested refining where we look to find measures of ENP.  Gaines 
(1997) suggests that researchers delve further into constituency-level analysis to provide 
a “fuller” view of national-level competition.   This process can be tedious and time-
consuming, especially in those polities with large numbers of constituencies, but Gaines' 
argument is that it provides a more realistic picture of party strength and competition, and 
can help identify aberrations from the expected outcome.  Geographic discrepancies can 
indicate the presence of regional divides or could correlate with demographic differences. 
Indeed, Chhibber and Kollman's analyses showed that the national party systems reported 
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a range of values—Canada and India being the exceptions on the high end—but that 
Duvergerian expectations were often realized at the constituency level (for examples, see 
Chhibber and Kollman, 2004: ch. 6).
Neto and Cox argue that the ENP appears to be dependent upon “the product of 
social heterogeneity and electoral permissiveness, rather than being an additive function 
of these two factors” (1997:  166-7).   In other  words,  they argue that  the greater  the 
number of exploitable cleavages in a polity and the more permissive the electoral system, 
the higher the likelihood of multipartism.  In effect, a polity with a plurality electoral 
system and few social cleavages likely operates with a bipartisan system.  Like Gaines, 
Neto and Cox suggest more openness to the idea of constituency-level analysis, not solely 
for election returns but also to find local indicators of social diversity.  In essence, Neto 
and Cox suggest that scholars probe the interaction between electoral laws and social 
cleavages as an intuitive indicator of ENP.
Overall,  the  effective  number  of  parties  measure  first  posited  by  Laakso  and 
Taagepera is the key indicator quantifying of the size of a party system, aiding in efforts 
to compare different cases and analyze Duvergerian effects on electoral events.  Taken by 
itself, ENP is a clinical measure that tells us little about the qualitative realities of party 
competition,  yet  ENP can also  be  applied  to  provide  a  detailed  summary of  a  party 
system when used in conjunction with other indicators and approaches.  For the purposes 
of all  research at  the provincial level in Canada, ENP analyses are among the lowest 
hanging  fruit  in  scholars'  reach  which  demonstrates  the  presence  of  research 
opportunities, in particular for academics with an interest in provincial politics.
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Alternative Measures of Party System Change
A more  recent  alternative  to  Laakso  and  Taagepera's  ENP was  proffered  by 
Golosov,  who critiqued  the  former's  measure  for  producing  unrealistically  high  ENP 
figures (2010: 187-8).  This index is expressed as where  n is  the 
number of parties, pi is the fractional share of the i-th component, pi2 is the square of each 
party's proportion of votes or seats, and p12 is the square of the largest party's proportion 
of votes or seats.  Generally speaking, figures devised from the Golosov index tend to be 
lower than those calculated using the Laakso-Taagepera index6.  Further, Golosov claims 
his index is more sensitive to the relative weight of parties in a given system, producing 
higher  figures  in  more  competitive  systems and smaller  scores  where  the  number  of 
important parties is relatively few (2010: 188).
Fractionalization  as  a  measure  of  party systems came to  prominence  in  Rae's 
(1967)  The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws.  In his discussion leading to the 
introduction of fractionalization as a concept, Rae looks first at simple measures of party 
system composition starting with the share of the vote won by any one party,  T, noting 
that  “[a]ny aggregate  description  of  elective  party  systems  will  be  constructed  from 
concepts which are derived from it” (1967: 49).  The indices used in this thesis largely 
draw upon the vote shares of competing parties to formulate their outputs.  Rae continues 
his discussion by looking at the number of parties receiving any votes, Ne, which he notes 
is helpful in the counting of parties but is less useful in describing party systems (Ibid.). 
Following  that,  Rae  examines  the  vote  share  of  the  strongest  party,  Pe,  which  may 
6 In my calculations of ENP at the provincial and sub-provincial levels in Nova Scotia, Golosov's formula 
has virtually always produced lower ENP scores than that of Laakso and Taagepera.
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indicate the degree of dominance of the first party within a given system but is limited in  
that it “tells us nothing about the competitive positions of the second, third, fourth, or n th 
parties” (50-51).  Lastly,  Rae determines the combined vote shares of the two largest 
parties,  We,  which  is  a  stronger  indicator  of  “how  closely  a  system  approaches  the 
condition of two-party competition” but “does not tell us how evenly the two compete 
with each other” (52).
To address gaps with other indicators, Rae devised the fractionalization of vote 
shares index,  Fe, that “resolves itself into two lesser concepts: (1) the number of party 
shares, and (2) the relative equality of these shares (53).  At one end of the spectrum sits a 
non-fractionalized system that contains only a single share, which “contains the whole 
pool of competitive power,” also described as a one-party system analogous to a whole 
apple (Ibid.), and whose fractionalization score would be 0.  At the other end would be a 
highly fractionalized system that “has a great many shares of about equal magnitude so 
that no one of them contains a very large share of the total pool of strength (i.e. votes),”  
which would indicate an extreme case of multipartism analogous to an apple sliced into 
many pieces (Ibid.), and whose fractionalization score would be closer to 17.
Rae  is  careful  not  to  equate  fractionalization  with  the  number  of  parties, 
acknowledging that the “relative equality of the party shares, whatever their number, is 
also an integral part of the (fractionalization) concept” (54).  Rae uses the comparative 
example of two party systems with three parties in each:  whereas the vote split in the  
first system is 90-6-4, the vote split among the parties in the second instance is 34-33-33. 
7 As opposed to a numerical value, Rae uses the term “unity” to refer to a highly fractionalized party 
system (1967: 57).
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Both systems have three parties, but it is plain to see that in the first instance there is little 
competition faced by the dominant party, ergo the first system is much less fractionalized 
than the second.  Moreover, the number of parties in a given system does not determine 
so much as it limits the extent of fractionalization, and a “given number of shares can 
attain only a certain degree of fractionalization” (Ibid.).  Therefore, by quantifying the 
fractionalization continuum, Rae's analysis is sensitized “to the many subtle variations 
found in actual elective party systems” (55).
Nwokora  and  Pelizzo  (2017)  devised  the  fluidity  index  for  use  as  a  “tool  to 
capture the stability of polity party systems”(8), which they did to counter problems of 
measurement in their analysis of African party systems.  To start, they note that party 
system changes can be detected by measuring fragmentation—not altogether dissimilar to 
Rae's  fractionalization  concept—and  power  alternation  as  “these  dimensions  together 
provide enough information to identify the type currently in operation and to determine 
whether and when any system changes occur” (2017: 6).  Nwokora and Pelizzo opt not to 
consider polarization in their analysis because, in the context of Africa, polarization “is 
not usually based on a left-right division” (16).  Moreover, changes to party systems are 
not always reflected in changes in polarization; and, even when changes in polarization 
are  detected,  those  changes  are  usually  reflected  in  alterations  to  fragmentation  and 
power alternation (2017: 6).
Nwokora and Pelizzo attempt to address problems with measurement with their 
fluidity index.  They note that two kinds of entity, “types” of party system and “polity” 
party systems, are typically the subject of measurement, although Nwokora and Pelizzo's 
38
goal with the fluidity index is “to capture the stability of polity party systems, which is a  
more difficult interpretation to operationalize” (6).  With typical measurement, the “aim 
is to assess and compare the tendency of different [party system] types to be stable or 
unstable,”  whereas  with  polity  measurement,  the  “aim is  to  assess  and  compare  the 
stability  of  country  or  regional  party  systems”  (Ibid.:  6-7).   For  both  measures,  the 
authors suggest that they be tested within the framework of a large-n study of cases.
Sartori  (2005) lays  out his criteria for counting parties in a given system, and 
again, this goes beyond a mere count of parties receiving votes or seats, although that 
serves as the initial step.  Sartori omits the counting of votes because “strength in seats... 
is,  in  the final analysis,  what  really counts once the elections are over” (2005: 107). 
Further,  he suggests  that  one begins  by measuring the “strength of the parliamentary 
party as indicated by its percentage of seats in the lower chamber” (Ibid.).  Further, he 
suggests  that  one  begins  by  measuring  the  “strength  of  the  parliamentary  party  as 
indicated by its percentage of seats in the lower chamber” (Ibid.).  To suss out any parties 
that should not be counted due to their lack of governing potential or relevance, Sartori 
posits two rules for when a party should or should not be counted.  The first is that a 
“minor party can be discounted as irrelevant whenever it remains over time superfluous, 
in the sense that it is never needed or put to use for any feasible coalition majority” (Ibid.: 
108).   Sartori's second rule is that a “party qualifies for relevance whenever its existence, 
or appearance, affects the tactics of party competition and particularly when it alters the 
direction of the competition... of the governing-oriented parties” (Ibid.).  To summarize, 
parties should be counted when they have “coalition potential,” they are able to provide 
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confidence  and supply—Sartori  uses  the  term “blackmail  potential”—or,  they have  a 
“competitive relevance in the oppositional arena” (Ibid.).
Whereas some aspects of the Sartori method rely on quantifiable measures, such 
as a  party's  legislative strength,  other  aspects  of his  method are more subjective and 
require thought and research on the part of the analyst.  A party may appear relevant on 
its  face  due  to  its  electoral  performance,  but  in  practice,  that  same  party  may  be 
superfluous  or  irrelevant  to  governing.   Sartori  discusses  the  example  of  sizable 
Communist parties in Europe “that poll one-fourth, and even as high as one-third of the 
total vote but whose governmental coalition potential has been... virtually zero,” and to 
account for this, he suggested that the analyst try to determine the “size or bigness” that 
makes  a  party  relevant,  all  other  things  notwithstanding  (Ibid.).   Furthermore,  some 
historical research on legislators, constituencies, and a party's public presence, such as 
media coverage, can provide qualitative insights into the relevance of a particular party. 
There have been cases across Canada of parties of personality, or those parties that have 
achieved representation as a result of a single member who is popular and entrenched in 
their  constituency,  but  beyond whose  boundaries  the  party is  organizationally  feeble. 
There  have  also  been  ephemeral  parties  that  have  contested  one  or  two  elections, 
sometimes successfully so, only to disappear into the ether shortly thereafter.  All this is 
to reassert the importance of carefully researching the case prior to making a subjective 
determination, for it is important to make the call—in this instance, whether a party is  
relevant—with as much information and background as possible.
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Lacunae
There are several gaps in the literature that this thesis seeks to address, and it is in 
so doing that this thesis will contribute to the wider study of party systems and electoral 
competition.  For instance, I have previously demonstrated an application of ENP at the 
county  level  in  Nova  Scotia,  which  I  pursued  because  provincial  constituencies  had 
historically  been  coterminous  with  county  boundaries  (Chezenko,  2017).   A similar 
approach could also be useful  for research into the party systems in other provinces, 
particularly  for  neighbouring  New  Brunswick  and  Prince  Edward  Island,  who  share 
similar histories to Nova Scotia when it comes to the drawing of electoral boundaries (see 
Carty,  1985;  Hyson,  1995).   Although  less  specific  than  analyzing  constituencies—
electors vote within the confines of ridings, which may not necessarily fit within one or 
more counties—the county-level approach does provide one with smaller, more stable 
units of analysis to compare over a longer period of time which, in turn, allows one to 
observe when and where changes in the provincial party system are occurring.  Why this 
is important is because it allows one to probe regional differences within the individual 
provinces—especially  the  smaller  provinces,  where  regional  differences  may  be  less 
evident to outside observers—at an established sub-provincial level, in a manner similar 
to how studies of Canadian federal party competition would look at  the provinces to 
attain regional statistical breakdowns.
Moreover, the provincial studies literature has tended to shy away from indicators, 
such as the effective number of parties, that have been effectively employed in national 
level comparative studies.  In one of the works cited here, for example, ENP was used 
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effectively to compare, map, and track regional differences in federal party competition 
over time (see Johnston and Cutler, 2009).  This thesis aims to adopt those methods and 
apply  them at  the  provincial  level  in  order  to  provide  a  more  robust  and  complete 
quantitative analysis of party systems and electoral competition in the provinces.
What's  more,  recent changes to electoral competition in Atlantic Canada merit 
further exploration.  In 2017, when I first started working on this thesis, the number of 
NSNDP MLAs was nearly double that of elected independent and third-party provincial 
politicians in the other Atlantic provinces combined.  That the NSNDP had previously 
formed a government, in addition to having maintained a considerable presence in the 
provincial  legislature  in  recent  decades,  contributed  to  my  interest  in  pursuing  the 
particular case of partisan competition in Nova Scotia.  Two years later, the Green Party 
of PEI serves as the official opposition to a PC minority government; the NLNDP has 
increased its  seat  count  while,  at  the same time,  losing half  of its  popular  vote;  two 
independent MHAs from Newfoundland retained their seats at the 2019 general election; 
and, there are four party caucuses—with multiple MLAs in each—now present in the 
New  Brunswick  legislature.   Something  is  up  in  Atlantic  Canada,  and  the  days  of 
tradition and conservatism certainly seem to be in the past.   To determine when and 
where  these  apparent  changes  in  electoral  competition  have  taken  root,  the  methods 
employed herein to examine Nova Scotia could be readily adapted to do the same in 
nearby provinces,  each  of  which  appears  to  be  undergoing  unforeseen  changes  with 
unpredictable outcomes.
Finally, from a theoretical standpoint, this thesis continues the conversation as to 
42
the  relevance  and validity of  Duverger's  Law.   Exploring  how and why the  NSNDP 
emerged to become a effective competitor to the province's two traditional parties seems 
counterintuitive to the Duvergerian theory that plurality electoral systems promote two-
partism;  after  all,  following  that  line  of  thinking,  such  a  scenario  ought  to  be  near 
impossible.  That said, critics of Duverger have often looked to Canada—more precisely, 
to Canadian federal politics—to dispute his concept, pointing to the multitude of parties 
that  have  been  represented  in  the  House  of  Commons  over  time.   Because  of  this, 
Duverger himself noted that Canada was exceptional,  yet he added that,  at  the riding 
level, the tendency towards two parties would reassert itself.  Without yet revealing the 
outcome of the data analysis herein, this thesis seeks to continue the lengthy conversation 
in the annals of political science as to the validity of Duverger's Law, whether its tenets 
can still be upheld, and whether we ought to proclaim as law a concept that appears to be 
flawed and dysfunctional.
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Chapter 3:  Methods
Within the literature on party systems, it is clear that there is no single indicator 
that defines or determines changes within a party system.  The measures that have been 
discussed  and  employed  typically  describe  changes  to  a  party  system by computing 
formulae that draw upon election results or legislative representation.  Some indices, such 
as  Laakso and Taagepera's  (1979) effective  number  of  parties,  have  attained a  broad 
acceptance among political  science scholars as a means of quantifying the number of 
viable  electoral contenders in  a polity,  as opposed to  merely counting the number of 
registered political entities.  The literature provides plenty of examples of formulae that 
seek  to  provide  a  reliable  indication  of  changes  to  party systems;  however,  the  best 
approach here is one that employs multiple measures, gathers and computes data, and 
analyzes the results for patterns that presage alterations to partisan competition.
To recap, the central research question of this thesis asks how and why a third 
party emerged as a credible contender for power, alongside the two traditional parties in 
Nova Scotia's  plurality  electoral  system.   In  this  chapter,  I  identify and describe  the 
indicators have been selected for this study of the Nova Scotia provincial party system. 
Some measures,  such as the two named above, are the creation of political  scientists 
whose  purpose  is  the  determination  of  particular  changes  to  patterns  of  electoral 
competition through the use of complex formulae.   Other indicators,  such as election 
returns  and  public  opinion  polling,  are  series  of  data  that  have  been  amassed  from 
documents that are publicly available from elections agencies or polling companies, as 
well as information gleaned from past newspaper articles and internet archives.  Results 
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are provided and will be discussed in the next chapter.
Overall, the purpose of these indicators is to show us the level of competition and 
the  relative  size  of  provincial  political  parties  in  Nova  Scotia  throughout  the  period 
between 1933 and 2017.  This will assist in determining whether and when the province's 
party system held to Duvergerian expectations—those being that two parties will be the 
dominant players within the confines of a plurality electoral system—as well as if and 
when the province veered from Duvergerian norms towards a different form of electoral 
competition among the parties.  Most of the indicators applied herein derive their data 
from election returns, as these returns fully captured the will of the electorate at a given 
point in time, and these particular records8 have been preserved for posterity virtually in 
their entirety.  In this chapter, I outline and describe the indicators used to provide the 
necessary data to answer the research question, beginning with the results of previous 
general elections.  To provide additional detail and to enhance our understanding of the 
most recent elections, I have included political polling data from a Nova Scotia-based 
market research company, data which can provide context particularly when it comes to 
leadership  and  popularity.   Then,  indicators  of  electoral  competition  drawn from the 
literature are employed to provide a more robust accounting of the state of play amongst 
the province's political parties over the last eight decades.
Election Returns
Complete Nova Scotia provincial election returns dating back to the 1933 general 
8 Elections  Nova  Scotia  provides  the  Election  Returns  for  provincial  general  elections  from  1933 
onwards,  which  include  valid  votes,  rejected  ballots,  and  total  number  of  electors.   For  previous 
elections, ENS provides an incomplete summary of results, with rejected ballots, numbers of electors, 
some vote totals, and some party affiliations omitted.  Elections Nova Scotia's data can be found at  
https://electionsnovascotia.ca/election-data/past-results.
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election can be found online, and it is these data that will drive the remainder of this 
thesis.  With regard to the 1933 general election, it is a significant event because it was 
the first Nova Scotia general election held within an electoral system consisting primarily 
of single-member districts (Nova Scotia, 1934).  Prior to this, provincial electoral districts 
in Nova Scotia  had multiple members,  ranging from two to five members per riding 
(Nova Scotia,  2011; Nova Scotia, 2018).  To summarize,  the analysis  herein of Nova 
Scotia elections and the province's party system commences at  1933 for two reasons: 
first,  that  a  full  complement  of  data  is  available  for  each  provincial  general  election 
including and after 1933; and, second, that the general election of 1933 was the first in a 
continuing series  of  elections  that  have  been held  largely9 under  a  system of  single-
member district plurality elections.
For  election  results,  the  information  was  sourced  from  original  documents 
published online by Elections Nova Scotia, all of which are available for download on 
their 'Past Elections Results' webpage.  This information was collected and processed in a 
spreadsheet, which ultimately established a temporal series of provincial general election 
data spanning eight decades.  The number of seats won, the number of votes received, 
and the percentage share of the popular vote received by each party are all listed in the 
original election documents, which go on form the baseline of my calculations; some of 
these  data  points—seats  and  votes  especially—are  employed  as  variables  in  other 
formulae,  such  as  in  calculating  the  effective  number  of  electoral  (votes)  and 
parliamentary (seats) parties.
9 Although the first single-member provincial electoral districts appeared in 1933, it was not until the 
1981  general  election  that  the  last  remaining  multi-member  ridings,  in  Inverness  and  Yarmouth 
counties, had been abolished.
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Public Opinion Polling
Corporate  Research  Associates  (CRA)10 is  a  market  research  firm  based  in 
Halifax, and they have been asking Nova Scotians what their partisan preferences are, 
through its  Atlantic Quarterly omnibus poll, since 1988.  Their polling is often cited in 
local news media when it is released, and they have been publishing their data online for 
over 15 years, which sets them apart from other market research firms11 as the pollster of 
record for Nova Scotia political polling.  Their public dissemination of data has made the 
information they provide readily accessible to anyone with an internet connection, and 
especially to researchers and individuals with an interest in Atlantic Canadian provincial 
politics.  Moreover, CRA has been conducting polls on a quarterly basis in the region for 
thirty years, which provides a significant series of data from which to draw information 
and insight into the political preferences of Atlantic Canadian voters over time.
Methodologically,  CRA  polls  between  800  and  1,200  Nova  Scotians  each 
February, May, August, and November, and releases the findings of their political polling 
in the first week of the following month.  The margin of error in their poll runs between 3 
and 4.5 percentage points at the 95 percent confidence level.  CRA asks and publicly 
releases three political questions:  the first question speaks to the respondent's satisfaction 
or dissatisfaction with the provincial government's performance; the second question asks 
10 Corporate Research Associates changed its  name to Narrative Research in April  2019.  For further 
detail, its website can be consulted at https://narrativeresearch.ca/say-hello-to-narrative-research/.
11 While there are several polling companies that occasionally conduct research in Nova Scotia, the issues 
with using their data here are two-fold, those being consistency and novelty.  Pollsters based outside of 
Atlantic Canada tend to concentrate their polling efforts haphazardly in and around election periods.  A 
recent  entrant  into  the  Atlantic  market,  MQO  Research  has  been  conducting  its  Atlantic  Matters 
omnibus poll on a quarterly basis since 2016 which, while providing a valuable set of political polling 
numbers, has not yet established a data set lengthy enough to usefully analyze for temporal trends.
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one's voting intention were a provincial election held as of the date of polling; and, the 
third question asks which party leader is the respondent's preferred option for premier.
In terms of accessibility, I was able to attain data from the Atlantic Quarterly poll 
directly from CRA's website, specifically all polling released in and after March 2006.  I 
was able to access much the same series of polling data released between June 2001 and 
March  2006  by searching  the  CRA website  through  the  Internet  Wayback  Machine, 
which is  a  search engine that  saves  archived versions  of websites  for posterity.   For 
releases prior to June 2001, I was able to piece together much of CRA's political polling 
data from archived newspaper articles; however, some gaps persist, particularly early on 
in the timeline.  In this thesis, the first partisan polling report is from November 1990,  
and  the  party  polling  series  ends  with  the  most  recent  poll  conducted  by CRA and 
released in June 2019.  The missing data in this time series are the releases in June and 
September 1993; March 1994; June and December 1995; and, March 1999.  CRA started 
asking their leadership preference question in May 2002, and government satisfaction 
data is available beginning with the polling released in September 2000.
While I discuss the data from CRA's Atlantic Quarterly poll in the next chapter, it 
is important to clarify how this data will assist in answering the central research question 
of this thesis, that being how and why a third party emerged as a credible governing 
alternative within the confines of a plurality electoral system.  Whereas elections occur 
infrequently—typically every three to four years—and irregularly12, CRA's polling does 
occur on a regular basis, providing us with four sets of data in each calendar year.  For 
instance, whereas a general election will provide a single set of data, this polling series 
12 Nova Scotia does not have fixed election date legislation.
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could  provide  16 sets  of  data,  measured  quarterly,  in  between two elections  that  are 
scheduled four years apart from one another.  Moreover, CRA's polling data coincides 
with the recent  period of  heightened electoral  competition in  Nova Scotia,  and these 
polling numbers will assist in answering the research question by illustrating provincial 
political competition between general elections over the last quarter-century.  The hope is 
that polling data will reveal patterns that could help us understand the nature of recent 
election  outcomes.   Was  support  for  the  historically  third-place  NSNDP ephemeral, 
appearing only at  election time?  Was the NSNDP able to consolidate and sustain its 
popular support between elections?  How did each of the party leaders affect his or her 
party's standing in the eyes of the electorate?  These questions, along with information 
from CRA's polling, will provide additional context on the state of the party system in 
Nova Scotia in recent years, and it will assist us in answering the main research question.
Sartori's Method for Counting Parties
To start,  Sartori  counts the number of seats  for each party in lower houses of 
national parliaments; however, as Nova Scotia has a unicameral legislature, the count will 
be of seats in the House of Assembly.  Further, Sartori suggests beginning by measuring 
the “strength of the parliamentary party as indicated by its percentage of seats in the 
lower chamber” (2005: 107).  To simplify this method, I start with a count of parties 
receiving seats in the House of Assembly.  From a glance at election returns, one can 
observe that there are a limited number of parties participating and receiving votes in 
provincial  elections—Nova Scotia  does  not  have  a  proportional  electoral  system that 
would result in a multitude of parties attaining legislative representation—and even fewer 
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parties winning seats.  Moreover, there are other methods used in this thesis that employ a 
quantitative measure of parliamentary strength, thus the purpose of the Sartori method 
here  is  to  illustrate  the  presence  of  'relevant'  parties  over  the  time  period  under 
examination here.
Next, Sartori looks at the “governing... or coalitional potential of each party,” by 
which he means “the extent to which a party may be needed as a coalition partner for one 
or more of the possible governmental majorities” (Ibid.: 107-8).  Nova Scotia has had 
periods  of  minority  government,  but  to  date,  it  has  never  experienced  a  coalition 
government.  For this aspect of Sartori's method, I look at the potential for a seated party 
to provide confidence and supply guarantees to a minority government.  Nova Scotia has 
experienced four periods of minority government as a result of the outcomes of general 
elections in 197013,  1998, 2003, and 2006.  While it  is  important not to preclude the 
potential for coalition formation, it is an extremely rare occurrence in Canadian politics, 
whereas agreements for confidence and supply are more commonplace.
To suss out any parties that should not be counted due to their lack of governing 
potential or relevance, Sartori posits two rules for when a party should or should not be 
counted.  The first is that a “minor party can be discounted as irrelevant whenever it  
remains over time superfluous, in the sense that it is never needed or put to use for any 
feasible  coalition  majority”  (Ibid.:  108).   In  this  category  would  be  independent 
candidates  and  members  of  small  upstart  parties  whose  legislative  presence  proves 
ephemeral, and in the context of Nova Scotia, these are extremely few—so much so that 
13 With respect to the 1970 general election outcome, the governing Liberal party had exactly half of the  
seats in the House of Assembly; however, a 1971 by-election victory meant that the Liberal party had an 
additional seat and, as a consequence, a majority government.
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this group consists of a single individual.  Sartori's second rule is that a “party qualifies 
for  relevance  whenever  its  existence,  or  appearance,  affects  the  tactics  of  party 
competition  and  particularly  when  it  alters  the  direction  of  the  competition...  of  the 
governing-oriented parties” (Ibid.).  To summarize, parties should be counted when they 
have “coalition potential,” they are able to provide confidence and supply—Sartori uses 
the  term  “blackmail  potential”—or,  they  have  a  “competitive  relevance  in  the 
oppositional arena” (Ibid.).
Whereas some aspects of the Sartori method rely on quantifiable measures, such 
as a  party's  legislative strength,  other  aspects  of his  method are more subjective and 
require thought and research on the part of the analyst.  A party may appear relevant on 
its  face  due  to  its  electoral  performance,  but  in  practice,  that  same  party  may  be 
superfluous  or  irrelevant  to  governing.   Sartori  discusses  the  example  of  sizable 
Communist parties in Europe “that poll one-fourth, and even as high as one-third of the 
total vote but whose governmental coalition potential has been... virtually zero,” and to 
account for this, he suggested that the analyst try to determine the “size or bigness” that 
makes a party relevant, all other things notwithstanding (Ibid.).
Furthermore, some historical research on legislators, constituencies, and a party's 
public  presence,  such  as  media  coverage,  can  provide  qualitative  insights  into  the 
relevance  of  a  particular  party.   There  have  been  cases  across  Canada  of  parties  of 
personality,  or  those  parties  that  have  achieved representation  as  a  result  of  a  single 
member  who  is  popular  and  entrenched  in  their  constituency,  but  beyond  whose 
boundaries the party is organizationally feeble.  There have also been ephemeral parties 
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that have contested one or two elections, sometimes successfully so, only to disappear 
into  the  ether  shortly  thereafter.   All  this  is  to  reassert  the  importance  of  carefully 
researching the case prior to making a subjective determination, for it is important to 
make the call—in this instance, whether a party is relevant—with as much information 
and background as possible.
As it pertains to the central research question in this thesis, the Sartori method will 
help us to establish the number of relevant political parties in Nova Scotia over time. 
This way of counting parties relies less on data indicators—aside from election returns—
and more on a qualitative analysis of the power and presence of political parties in the 
province, in particular their ability to win seats, to influence policy and the orientation of 
the two main parties, and to form a confidence agreement or a government in their own 
right.  Unlike data indicators that can give us a precise weighting on political parties in a 
given system, the Sartori  method is  more subjective,  as it  requires some background 
knowledge of a polity's political and electoral history, and it requires the analyst to make 
decisions whether or not to count a party while following Sartori's set of rules.  Still, this 
method will help us establish our expected parameters—how many relevant or effective 
political  parties  have  there  been  in  Nova  Scotia—before  embarking  further  into  the 
methods of quantitative data analysis.
Effective Number of Electoral and Parliamentary Parties
Next,  drawing  from  Laakso  and  Taagepera  (1979),  I  calculate  the  effective 
number of  parties  in  Nova Scotia.   ENP is  expressed as  N =  1/Σpi2,  where  pi is  the 
fractional share of the i-th component (1979: 24).  ENP can be determined in two ways: 
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it can be calculated using the vote totals in a constituency or a jurisdiction, the outcome 
being  the  effective  number  of  electoral parties  or  ENEP;  alternatively,  it  can  be 
calculated using the number of seats each party won at an election, which is called the 
effective number of  parliamentary  parties or ENPP.  Typically, ENP is lower than the 
actual number of parties in competition, as this measure indicates the relative strength of 
parties in a system, unless parties are near parity in their levels of support.  Moreover, 
ENPP tracks lower than ENEP because the latter produces information based upon the 
number  of  valid  votes  cast  for  all  parties,  whereas  the  former  draws  upon  the  seat 
distribution following an election which, in a plurality system, tends to over-award the 
first-place party and to penalize those parties finishing in second place or lower.  As a 
result, ENEP is a “better indicator of the long-term nature of the party system [because it] 
is affected by the operation of the electoral system in previous elections [and not] by the 
translation of votes into seats in the current election” (Lijphart, 1990: 483).
A more recent reconfiguration of Laakso and Taagepera's ENP was proffered by 
Golosov, whose critique of the original ENP formula is that it produces unrealistically 
high  ENP scores  (2010:  187-8).   Golosov's  ENP is  expressed  as 
where n is the number of parties, pi is the fractional share of the i-th component, pi2 is the 
square of each party's proportion of votes or seats, and  p12 is the square of the largest 
party's proportion of votes or seats.  The benefit of the reimagined ENP formula, Golosov 
claims, is that his index is more sensitive to the relative weight of parties in a given 
system, producing higher figures in more competitive systems and smaller scores where 
the number of important parties is relatively few (2010:  188).  To test the new formula 
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comparatively against  Laakso-Taagepera,  I  will  also  calculate  both  ENEP and  ENPP 
using the Golosov index.  If Golosov's claims are correct, his formula should put out 
more  conservative  ENP  scores  that  accurately  gauge  the  true  level  of  competition 
amongst the parties.
Using the effective number of parties as a means of analyzing the party system of 
a jurisdiction, and comparing jurisdictions to one another, is hardly new (for instance, see 
Laakso and Taagepera, 1979; Gaines, 1999; Park, 2003; Chhibber and Kollmann, 2004; 
Johnston and Cutler, 2009; Johnston, 2013).  What is new is the application of ENP to the 
study of provincial politics, specifically Nova Scotia.  Determining ENP will be critical to 
finding out  how and why a  third  party emerged as  a  credible  alternative  to  the  two 
traditional parties in Nova Scotia's plurality electoral system.  How many effective parties 
has there been in Nova Scotia over time?  Has competition fluctuated between a greater 
and smaller number of effective parties?  When was competition weakest, and when was 
it  more intense?    Is  there a difference between province-wide ENP and ENP in the 
ridings?  These are all questions to which ENP calculations can provide answers and 
insight in response to primary research question.
Rae's Fractionalization Index of Votes and Seats
The fractionalization index is “based on the probability that any two randomly 
selected  voters  will  have  chosen  different  parties  in  any  given  election,”  which  is 
advantageous as this measure is “sensitive to both the number and relative equality of the 
party shares” and it  allows consideration of and comparisons with “systems with any 
number of parties” (Rae, 1967: 55-6).  Rae explains that the “chance that our two voters 
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will have chosen the same party is equal to the sum of the squared decimal shares of the 
vote obtained by all parties, [and it] follows that the probability of diadic disagreement, 
Fe,  is  the  complement  of  this  quantity”  (Ibid.:  56).   Expressed  as  an  equation,  the 
fractionalization index is Fe = 1 – (Σti2), where Ti is equal to a given party's decimal share 
of the vote.  When used to examine parliamentary fractionalization, Ti is equal to a given 
party's decimal share of seats.  The values produced by this index “occupy a continuum, 
running  from  non-fractionalization  in  a  perfect  one-party  system  (Fe equal  zero)  to 
complete fractionalization—an event never occurring in reality or the formula—defined 
by the limiting Fe value of unity” (Ibid.: 57).
TABLE 3.1
PROPERTIES OF RAE'S FRACTIONALIZATION INDEX
NUMBER PROPERTY
1 The values range between the limits of zero and one.
2 The values may be treated as components of an interval scale, with a fixed 
zero point (sometimes called a ratio scale).
3 The values are consistent with the concept of fractionalization.
4 The measure may be applied to any party system, whatever the total number 
of parties
5 The measure is sensitive to all the data: each party's share is included.
6 The same measure may be used for legislative party systems, by substituting 
seat shares for vote shares.
Source:  Rae, 1967: 58.
Use  of  Rae's  fractionalization  index  in  this  thesis  is  to  provide  an  additional 
indicator  that  will  demonstrate  similar  phenomena  as  observed  when  calculating  the 
effective number of parties,  as both are  measures  of multipartism.   For  instance,  the 
fractionalization index runs from one-party rule at  zero, to two-partism at 0.5, and to 
complete fragmentation at one; thus a fractionalization index outcome of 0.5 in a given 
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jurisdiction would be expected if ENEP calculations produced an outcome of 2.  In sum, 
the higher the fractionalization score, the more parties there are in competition within the 
party  system.   Used here,  fractionalization  is  applied  to  the  case  of  Nova  Scotia  to 
provide another point of comparison to jurisdictions across Canada and elsewhere,  as 
well as providing more context on the party system and electoral competition within the 
province, all of which aides in responding to the primary research question.
Combined Vote Share and Relative Proportions
Lastly, I employ a method inspired by what Rae refers to as the combined vote 
share of the two strongest parties (1967: 51), which is expressed as We = Ta + Tb, where Ta 
is the vote share of the strongest party in terms of votes received, and Tb represents the 
vote  share  of  the  second  strongest  party.   While  it  appears  to  provide  a  “simplistic 
definition of two-party competition,” particularly as it informs the analyst of “the degree 
to which the two together dominate all comers,” it does not inform us how the two main 
contenders compete with one another (Ibid.: 52).  Still, for the purposes of this thesis, it 
will provide some valuable insight into partisan competition in Nova Scotia, as one the 
questions that arises in this research is how dominant are the two main parties relative to 
their counterparts, but especially the party that finishes third, as fourth parties are few in 
number and historically lack electoral strength.
By employing the combined vote method,  the proportion of  the two strongest 
parties' vote shares relative to that of the third party can be determined, as opposed to 
simply adding the vote shares of the two largest electoral parties.  The aim here is to see 
if  the  third strongest  party actually gets  stronger  over  time—lending credence to  my 
56
claim that there is a three-party system of late—and, if so, to what degree.  To do this, I  
decimalized the vote shares of the parties finishing first, second, and third.  While the 
final numbers will be rounded to the hundredth position, these figures were used in a 
spreadsheet which calculated to 15 places after the decimal point for a more accurate 
reading.  It should be noted that, over time, the political parties occupying those slots do 
change; however, this measure is not meant to look at a specific party so much as to see 
how the top three contenders fare electorally, relative to the party finishing third.  Once 
the parties' vote shares were decimalized, I divided the first party's share by that of the 
third; then, I did likewise with the second party's vote share.  While redundant, I divided 
the third party's vote share by itself, which provided the baseline of 1.  Above all, the aim 
of this particular method is to determine the relative proportion of the vote shares of the 
first  and second parties to that of the third party:   the question here is  for each vote 
received by the third party, how many votes were received by the first and second parties.
The Next Chapter
Results  for  each  method  noted  above  will  be  provided  and  discussed  in  the 
following chapter.  To be clear, the methods used in this thesis are not the only ones 
employed in party systems studies, but they have been chosen strategically.  At first sight, 
election returns provide the essential piece of any puzzle pertaining to electoral and party 
systems, as they are the expressed will of the electorate, they are verifiable, and they have 
not  been  altered  or  forged.   Use  of  Sartori's  (2005)  method  of  counting  parties  can 
provide us with qualitative information on the number of relevant parties that will guide 
our expectations when we eventually turn to quantitative measures.  As well, methods 
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like  the  effective  number  of  parties—devised  by  Laakso  and  Taagepera  (1979)  and 
revised by Golosov (2010)—and fractionalization have been used in political science for 
several decades and have been successfully employed in comparative national studies 
(see Rae, 1967; Laakso and Taagepera, 1979; Gaines, 1997; Gaines, 1999; Chhibber and 
Kollman, 2004; Johnston and Cutler, 2009; Golosov, 2010; Johnston, 2013).
Most  importantly,  however,  is  that  these  methods  are  being  employed  at  the 
subnational level to analyze a single case.  The thinking here is that these methods could 
be employed in other subnational jurisdictions either on a case-by-case basis or as the 
foundation  for  a  comparative  cross-jurisdictional  analysis  of  party  systems  in  the 
Canadian provinces.  In this thesis,  the aforementioned methods will  be employed to 
track changes within the party system and among electoral competitors in Nova Scotia 
over time, precisely in the years between the general elections of 1933 and 2017.  While 
election returns are essential to this project, additional information must be brought in to 
ensure the findings are rigorous, robust, and able to withstand close scrutiny.
Public opinion polling provides us with more data points in between elections 
occurring  over  the last  quarter-century.   These  data  provide snapshots  in  time of  the 
political  predilections  of  respondents  and,  while  conducted  by  a  reputable  research 
organization following scientific polling methods, the primary purpose of opinion polls is 
to provide a general idea of the prevailing political preferences in the province at a given 
point in time; however, opinion polls do not offer specific answers to questions about 
party systems.  The subjectivity inherent in Sartori's method of counting parties provides 
us with a framework to temper our expectations as to the number of relevant parties.  
58
Drawn  from  the  literature,  the  qualitative  methods  used  will  provide  a  stream  of 
information  separate  and  distinct  from  election  returns  and  quantitative  analyses  of 
partisan competition within the province.  When employed together, we should have the 
answers as to how and why a third party in Nova Scotia became a viable governing 
alternative to the two older and historically dominant political parties.
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Chapter 4:  Quantitative Results
Recalling that the central research question of this thesis asks how a third party 
emerged as a credible contender for power, alongside the two traditional parties in Nova 
Scotia's plurality electoral system, it is in this chapter that the results gleaned from the 
measures listed in the previous chapter will be reviewed and analyzed to examine the 
quantifiable changes to Nova Scotia's party system over the last 85 years.  It is expected 
that,  over  the  first  six  decades  under  analysis  here,  the  traditional  formation  of  the 
provincial party system will be apparent, with the Liberal and Progressive Conservative 
parties  forming  either  the  government  or  official  opposition,  followed  by the  distant 
presence of third parties, in particular the CCF and, later, the NSNDP.  Furthermore, it is 
expected that alterations to the traditional pattern will emerge beginning with the 1998 
general election, and that those changes will persist thereafter.
The reasoning behind my hypothesis is drawn primarily from two sources, those 
being the literature and recent political events within the province.  In the literature on 
Nova Scotia politics, which I discuss in chapter 2, a consistent theme throughout is the 
traditional composition of the party system—which was dominated by the Liberal and 
Progressive Conservative parties—that had persisted since Confederation, and which had 
endured into the 1990s (see Bellamy, 1976; Carbert, 2016; Hyson, 1973; Jenson, 1976; 
O'Neill  and  Erickson,  2003).   Moreover,  the  province's  conservative  tendency—by 
conservative,  what  is  meant  is  not  ideology;  rather,  it  is  an  aversion  to  change—
effectively meant  that  the  results  of  elections  were  predictable  because  of  traditional 
voting habits, particularly within families, and the provincial electorate's willingness to 
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re-elect governments for three or more terms (see Beck, 1954; Beck, 1978; O'Neill and 
Erickson, 2003).  With respect to the results from the data, two-party dominance is to be 
expected from the 1930s through the 1960s.  Beginning in the 1970s, however, gradual 
changes in the trendlines should be observed—such as a steady increase in the vote share 
of third party NSNDP from the 1970s through the 1990s.  This would indicate that voters' 
adherence to traditional and predictable voting patterns had started to change, and that 
voters  were  open  to—if  not  immediately  willing  to  support—a  third  party  and  its 
message.  While this thesis only looks at elections dating back to 1933, at which time 
single-member districts were introduced, it is still expected that the patterns of two-party 
competition and lengthy terms for governments will appear during the earlier decades 
being reviewed here.
Recent political events have also altered the dynamics of partisan competition in 
the province.  In the last two decades, general elections in Nova Scotia have been more 
competitive with three,  relatively equal parties positioned as the primary participants. 
Both traditional governing parties have spent time as the third party, for instance, in terms 
of both seats in the House of Assembly and votes attained at the ballot box, a situation 
that would have been highly improbable in previous years.  Moreover, as the literature 
demonstrates, leaders matter, especially when it comes to the electoral fortunes of their 
parties, and the choice of certain leaders has appeared to both help and hinder the major 
parties over the last 20 years.  Armed with the results of recent provincial elections, and 
mindful of recent political events, the data guided my expectations as it relates to the 
changing competitive dynamic among Nova Scotia's political parties which, on their face, 
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suggest that a three-party system is in place.  Missing, however, is a stronger sense of the 
outcomes  of  Nova  Scotia  elections  in  decades  past,  including  how  those  outcomes 
affected  the  composition  of  the  provincial  party  system  over  time,  as  well  as  an 
awareness of the dynamics at play in more recent provincial electoral contests.
Taken altogether, the indicators used in this thesis will assist in establishing how 
and when the NSNDP emerged to be a governing alternative to the historical governing 
parties in Nova Scotia by pointing to changes in popular support; changes in the location 
of that support; the presence of viable or 'effective' political parties; and, the growth of 
the provincial party system from a bipartisan structure to a system with room for three. 
My  hypothesis  is  that  the  NSNDP  underwent  a  change  in  its  electoral  base  in  a 
geographic sense, migrating from its traditional heartland in the industrial towns of Cape 
Breton County towards  the growing metropolitan areas  in  and around Halifax.   This 
change  would  have  been  driven  primarily  by  necessity,  as  Halifax  County  has 
experienced consistent growth in terms of its population as opposed to elsewhere in Nova 
Scotia,  where  population  levels  have  been  stagnant  or  declining.   Furthermore,  the 
NSNDP would have also been the benefactor of sharp decreases in the level of support 
for the traditional parties throughout the 1990s, bringing in voters who would not have 
otherwise voted for them.  Keep in mind, these expected changes to partisan competition 
would have occurred concurrently within a plurality electoral system that experienced 
few changes, a scenario that Duverger's Law holds should not happen.
Election Returns
Figures 4.01 and 4.02 show the outcomes of Nova Scotia general elections, in 
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terms of the vote share and number of seats, respectively, from 1933 to 2017 inclusive. 
At a  glance,  several important patterns emerge that  begin to  tell  the tale of electoral 
competition in Nova Scotia over the last eight decades.
In chronological order, we see first a period of Liberal predominance over the 
provincial party system, lasting from 1933 through 1956; however, this was more of a 
Figure 4.02:  Distribution of seats following Nova Scotia general elections since 1933
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continuation of that party's long term grip on power, as the Liberals been in government 
previously for a record 43 years, from 1882 to 1925, during what was an extended period 
of one-party-dominant provincial politics (see also Carbert, 2016).  The data also show a 
cycle  of  Conservative  decline  in  the  aftermath  their  election  loss  and  defeat  as 
government in 1933, which was later followed by a gradual rise in popular support after 
that party's severe loss in the 1945 general election14, in which no Conservatives were 
elected and that party was replaced by the two-member CCF caucus as the province's 
official opposition.  Concurrently, the CCF contested its first general election in 1933 but 
did not breakthrough until 1941, when it won three seats in Industrial Cape Breton and 
seven percent of the vote provincewide.   The party's  popular support peaked in 1945 
when it reached 13.6 percent, and despite winning one fewer seat than in the election four 
years prior, it formed the official opposition as the Conservatives were shut out of the 
House of Assembly.  In later years, CCF support would stabilize at less than ten percent 
across Nova Scotia, as its electoral base was highly concentrated in eastern Cape Breton, 
where it would win a seat or two at each election.  The CCF became the New Democratic  
party in 1961, and it failed to win a seat in its first two general elections with that name.
Second, we notice a period of increased electoral competition among the parties, 
beginning in earnest in the mid-1950s and becoming increasingly competitive during the 
1970s, with the Progressive Conservative and Liberal parties competing for government 
to the former's advantage, with the third-place NDP gradually rising and consolidating its 
support with about 15 percent of the provincial electorate.  After winning the general 
14 The 1945 general election result is aberrational.  The Conservatives outpolled the CCF by a significant 
20-point margin, but the inefficiency of the Conservative vote produced zero elected members, whereas 
the CCF's vote, heavily concentrated in eastern Cape Breton County provided that party with two seats 
and Official Opposition status, a feat that would go unmatched by its successor for another 49 years.
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election in 1956, the PCs would spend all but eight of the following 37 years in power. 
While  they  lost  the  1970  election  in  a  close  race  to  the  Liberals,  the  PCs  actually 
outpolled them by several  thousand votes.   During this  period,  only in  1974 did the 
Conservatives lose an election outright in terms of votes and seats.
The  Liberals,  meanwhile,  entered  a  period  of  decline  shortly  after  the  1945 
general election, bottoming out in the mid-1960s when it registered between four and six 
seats  and  about  40  percent  of  the  vote.   The  party  recovered  in  the  1970s,  holding 
government under the leadership of Gerald Regan, only to enter into a cycle of steep 
decline through the mid-1980s.  The Liberals returned to power in 1993 with physician 
and  former  Dartmouth  mayor  John  Savage  as  leader  and  premier,  winning  a  large 
majority of seats on nearly 50 percent of the popular vote.
For its part, the NSNDP maintained a steady level of support from 1970 through 
the early 1990s.  Following a spike in its share of the popular vote in the 1974 election, 
the NSNDP consolidated its support which it maintained at between 12 and 18 percent 
over  the course of  the following two decades,  yet  it  remained mired in  its  historical 
position as the third party, winning only between one and four seats in general elections 
during this time.  Overall, for most of the first 60 years of elections observed here, we can 
see an otherwise orderly ebb and flow among the two older parties, with both typically 
alternating between government and opposition after several terms in office.
Beginning in 1998, however, we can clearly see a scramble for popular support 
among three, closely matched political parties, a sight previously unseen in Nova Scotia. 
More interesting, it is an enduring pattern that continues to shape the province's electoral 
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politics.  The 1998 provincial general election was the closest in the province's history, 
with the three parties finishing within about five percentage points of one another in the 
popular vote, and a nearly even distribution of seats.  The three main parties appear to 
actively  compete  and  jostle  for  the  lead  positions,  as  all  have  held  the  roles  of 
government, official opposition, and third party since 1998, and all have maintained their 
popular support in general elections within a band between 20 and 40 percent of the 
electorate, the exceptions being the NSNDP and Liberal majority victories in 2009 and 
2013, respectively.
What's more, the NSNDP finished second in the popular vote for the first time 
ever in 1998, and formed the official opposition for the first time since its predecessor, 
the CCF, managed the feat nearly fifty years prior.  A little more than a decade later, the 
NSNDP would form its  first government in Nova Scotia.   But this  emergence of the 
historical third party as a viable governing option is just one aspect of the pattern in 
electoral competition observed over the last 20 years.  One important observation is how 
the  NSNDP's  electoral  base  gravitated  from the  labour  heartland  of  Industrial  Cape 
Breton toward the provincial capital, with its hundreds of thousands of electors and its 
share of about 40 percent of all seats in the legislature; I will return to this point in more 
detail at the end of this chapter. 
On its face, these election returns begin to tell the story of increased multipartism 
and growing fractionalization among the provincial  electorate.   The change from two 
competitive parties to three took place over decades, was not immediately apparent, and 
was not predestined to occur.  One trend of note in the results for the two long-tenured 
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parties is the occurrence of a majority in the popular vote:  only once since 1970 has any 
party received over 50 percent of valid votes, which the Conservatives achieved in 1984, 
a bumper year electorally for conservative parties across North America.  (In comparison, 
the  Liberal  party  has  not  achieved  a  majority  in  the  popular  vote  since  the  general 
election  of  1949.)   In  the  years  since  1970,  the  third-party NDP have  secured  their 
electoral gains to establish a base of support of around 20 percent of the electorate, and 
while their voters come from an array of backgrounds, this establishment of a critical 
mass of supporters has had the effect of lowering the ceiling over the other two major 
parties, to the point that the Conservatives last cracked 40 percent of the popular vote 30 
years ago, and the Liberals have only exceed 40 percent in a general election twice in the 
last 40 years.  What this suggests is that the electorate is no longer presented with two 
viable electoral options, swinging like a pendulum between the two depending on the 
electoral cycle.  Instead, three political parties have a sustainable base of support of at  
least 20 percent of the provincial electorate, with the remainder being the swing voters 
who divide their votes and, ultimately, decide elections.
Public Opinion Polling
The purpose of using Corporate Research Associates' public opinion polling here 
is to supplement election data for the most recent period of elections which have been 
characterized by multiparty competition,  with the goal  of filling in  the gaps between 
general elections with an additional indicator of the political preferences of the provincial 
electorate.  To reiterate from the previous chapter, CRA's political opinion polling occurs 
on a regular basis, once every quarter, thus providing us with four intervals of data per 
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year.
This data will assist in answering the research question by demonstrating whether 
the competitive,  three-party makeup of  the  Nova Scotia  party system was merely an 
election campaign period phenomenon, or whether it was a more durable condition that 
continued between elections and redefined interparty competition across the province. 
The difference between these two scenarios is important because they exemplify very 
different situations and outcomes.  In the former, a third party benefits from temporary 
conditions such as the electorate's disaffection and exhaustion with a major party, as was 
the case with the rises and falls of the Confederation of Regions party in New Brunswick 
in the early 1990s (Martin, 1998) and the Action démocratique du Québec in the mid-
2000s (Bélanger, 2009; see also Allan and Vengroff, 2009).  In the latter, something more 
significant is happening as a new party attains a position of strength within the party 
system, captures and retains a significant portion of the electorate, and challenges the 
entrenchment  of  the  established order,  as  exemplified  by the  emergence  of  the  Parti 
Québécois in the 1970s (see Pinard and Hamilton, 1978), or the sudden breakthrough of 
the Bloc Québécois and Reform parties in the 1993 federal election (see Erickson, 1995). 
Public opinion polls can help us to see, in the case of the NSNDP, whether their rise was 
merely an ephemeral blip in the history of party politics in Nova Scotia, or whether it 
represented a lasting shift in the composition of the provincial party system.
Moreover, in addition to the party preferences, CRA started asking its respondents 
in 2002 which of the party leaders they preferred to be premier.  This provides us with a 
second indicator on leadership, specifically by gauging the electorate's acceptance of the 
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party heads as potential provincial leaders, which the literature clearly states is important 
to voters when they are making up their mind as to how they will mark their ballot (see 
Bittner, 2010; Bittner, 2018).  It should also show how the leader fares in comparison to 
their party in public opinion, with a nod to the effect of the leader on their party, the 
thinking here being that a party leader who outperforms their party ought to provide it  
with an electoral advantage, just as one who underperforms will  likely prove to be a 
hindrance to party candidates at the ballot box.  With regard to the research question, 
leadership polling data will provide insight into the impact the actual party leaders had on 
their parties electoral performance in recent years.
Figure 4.03 shows the party preferences of those polled by Corporate Research 
Associates (CRA) from November 1990 through June 2019, and Figure 4.04 shows the 
leadership  preferences  of  respondents  since  CRA first  asked  the  question  in  2002. 
Despite some missing data15 from the 1990s, several patterns are apparent.   First  and 
foremost, the three main parties remain in close competition throughout the 2000s, with 
none exceeding 40 percent support nor falling below 20, and each remaining fairly close 
to the 30 percent line, which effectively served as the median.  Moreover, each of the 
three parties experienced fluctuations, polling either first, second, or third over the course 
of the decade, with the Liberals performing slightly better in the first half of the 2000s, 
and the NSNDP performing better in later years.  This result corresponds to anecdotal 
evidence  that  Nova  Scotia  was  home  to  a  tight,  three-way  political  battleground. 
Furthermore, it confirms that the election returns were not simply outliers, as each of the 
15 CRA political polling data is missing for the intervals of June and September 1993, and June 1995. 
Partial data was found for the CRA polls released in March 1994, December 1995, and March 1999.
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three parties remained competitive throughout this period both in opinion polling and at 
the ballot box.
Second, it is clear that there are spikes in support in and around the time that a 
majority government is formed.  This is observed in 1993, 1999, 2009, and 2013, after 
the election of Liberal, PC, NDP, and Liberal majority governments, respectively.  These 
spikes are typically followed by a decline, with the parties slipping back to their typical  
polling levels, although the Liberal majority elected in 2013 enjoyed a resurgence around 
2015, when their federal counterparts led by Justin Trudeau swept Atlantic Canada on 
their way to a big majority victory in that year's national election.  The NSNDP, too,  
experienced an uptick in support, also in 2015, around the time that their counterparts in 
Alberta, led by Rachel Notley, formed an unlikely majority government.  Same goes for 
the Nova Scotia Greens, as their polling numbers experienced an uptick following the 
breakthrough performance of their Prince Edward Island counterparts in that province's 
Figure 4.03:  CRA Party Preference Polling Data for Nova Scotia, 1990 – 2019
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April 2019 general election.  This alludes to the impact of external political events on the 
preferences  of  the  Nova  Scotia  electorate,  although  the  trendlines  suggest  that  such 
influences tend to be ephemeral,  and none has coincided with an election so that the 
affected party could reap the reward.  As it pertains to the honeymoon period experienced 
by majority governments, the polling data appears to suggest that the coalitions of voters 
that brought each of those parties to power are temporary, as they are likely composed of 
loyalists,  party  switchers,  and  swing  voters,  the  latter  two  groups  being  the  most 
susceptible to abandoning the new majority government by the time of the subsequent 
election.
Thirdly, the lack of impact that the smallest parties have in the provincial political 
arena is evident both in the election returns and in the polling data.   Support for the 
provincial Green party, which CRA began to track as of that party's founding in 2006, has 
remained flat between three and six percent over that last dozen years.  As previously 
noted, GPNS support rose above 10 percent in the first CRA poll conducted after the 
election of  eight  Green MLAs on Prince Edward Island in the spring of 2019.   The 
Atlantica Party, an upstart right-wing populist group, has barely registered.  Other fringe 
parties, such as the Marijuana and Nova Scotia parties, disbanded in the early 2000s with 
no lasting influence on the province's electoral politics or its public policy.  This further 
establishes the political environment in Nova Scotia as a highly competitive one for the 
three main parties, with smaller political entities effectively being squeezed out of the 
fray.
Overall, this series of public opinion polling data is important because it provides 
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us with information on the preferences of the provincial electorate, beyond that which is 
found in election returns.  While we may deduce the electorate's preference for premier 
on the basis of the party of the candidate for which they voted, this is not always a clear-
cut process, as some individual candidates are able to draw upon supporters beyond their 
own political party on the basis of their own personality, popularity, and record in office,  
for example.  CRA's polling, therefore, provides us with indicators of the popular support 
of the political parties and their respective leaders.
Without the polling data from CRA, we would be reliant upon general election 
data that is typically produced once every several years, whereas CRA conducts its poll 
of political preferences on a quarterly basis and has done so for thirty years, providing 
observers  with  more  data  to  analyze  and to  supplement  election  returns.   Moreover, 
CRA's  consistent  presence  in  the  Nova  Scotia  marketplace  over  several  decades, 
Figure 4.04:  CRA Leadership Preference Polling Data for Nova Scotia, 2002 – 2019
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especially with its political preference surveys, implies a measure of trust and confidence 
in its data that other polling firms simply do not possess, in particular those who gauge 
public opinion only in the days and weeks immediately preceding an election.
Sartori's Method for Counting Parties
The results of the Sartori count of parties can be found in Figure 4.05.  To recap, 
the Sartori method ultimately provides a count of parties deemed to have an important 
impact on the direction of partisan competition within a polity through their potential as 
coalition partners or as governing alternatives, or through the ability of smaller parties to 
alter to direction and focus of election campaigns among larger governing parties.  For 
the purpose of this thesis, the Sartori method is used to further establish the parameters of 
the provincial party system in Nova Scotia by providing us with a quantitative measure of 
the number of parties.  Just because a party receives votes, however, does not mean that 
they are impactful on the nature of electoral competition or on the structure of the party 
system.  Sartori (2005) remarked that post-Cold War communist parties in Europe, for 
example, despite their ability to attain a sizeable number of votes and seats, were largely 
ineffective and inconsequential  because other  parties did not  want to  form governing 
coalitions  with  them,  and they could  not  win elections  to  govern in  their  own right.  
Therefore, the use of the Sartori method in this thesis is meant to establish a baseline for 
the number of parties within the provincial party system, in particular those which are 
able to win or be brought into government, or which are able to affect how other parties 
campaign and present themselves to the electorate, along with the policy positions they 
are willing to offer.
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In executing the Sartori method, one begins by counting the number of parties 
attaining seats in the House of Assembly, which in Nova Scotia has varied between two 
and four since 1933, numbers which are indicated by the green bars in the chart above. 
(Data from the Sartori count can be found in Table 4.6 in the Appendix).  Next, one looks 
at the “coalitional” potential of the seated parties, which has been adapted here to look at 
parties with the ability to provide confidence and supply to a minority government, as 
coalition governments are a rarity in Canada and have not occurred in Nova Scotia.  One 
party fit that description in 1970—albeit for a brief time—and two parties were counted 
as coalitional in 1998, 2003, and 2006.
During the minority government years of the late 1990s and mid 2000s, each of 
the three party caucuses were large, in most cases numbering in excess of 10 members 
each.  The 19-seat Liberal minority government elected in 1998 relied on the 14-seat 
Progressive Conservative caucus for support during its short term in office, and the PCNS 
Figure 4.05:  Parties with seats and Sartori count of parties in Nova Scotia, 1933 – 2017
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minorities of the mid 2000s relied on both the LPNS and NSNDP for confidence and 
supply at various points during its time in power, which is why two parties are counted as 
necessary for confidence and supply because either opposition party could have been 
called upon to support the government.  While the coalitional number is not added to the 
overall number of parties with seats, thus there is no increase, what it does is reinforce the 
overall number of parties as relevant entities, as one is in government and the other two 
parties with seats have coalition potential, which in this instance would be an offer to 
support the government on a given bill or matter of confidence.
Furthermore, following the 1970 general election, the LPNS and PCNS, the latter 
of which was the incumbent government, received 23 and 21 seats, respectively, in the 
46-seat  House  of  Assembly;  with  two  seats,  the  NSNDP were  thus  in  a  position  to 
provide confidence to either party.  The Liberals ultimately formed the government, and 
later achieved a one-seat majority as a result of a 1971 by-election.  The 1970 election 
was also of historical significance as it was the only time in the province's history that a 
government was formed by a party that received less votes than a competitor,  as the 
PCNS received several thousand more votes than the LPNS despite coming up short in 
the seat count.
Sartori's count of parties also determines the number of superfluous parties, or 
those that are not important to the formation of government nor are they necessary for  
confidence and supply.  Single-issue parties or personality-based political movements are 
examples of superfluous parties.  Additionally, the Sartori count seeks to distinguish a 
seated party as a relevant one on account of the number of votes it receives or because a 
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party has the effect of altering “the tactics of party competition” or “the direction of 
competition  of  the  governing-oriented  parties”  (Sartori,  2005:  108).   In  1945,  for 
example, the Conservative party received a third of all votes cast in that election yet it 
failed  to  win  a  single  seat,  in  part  because  its  support  was  not  concentrated  in  any 
particular region of Nova Scotia.  In Cape Breton County, two CCF MLAs were elected 
because that party's support was heavily concentrated in the colliery towns of Glace Bay 
and New Waterford, both of which comprised the bulk of two separate constituencies. 
Thus,  one  relevant  party—the  Conservative  party—is  added  to  the  Sartori  count  of 
parties in that election despite its failure to win a single seat.
It is interesting to observe that the Sartori count of parties in Nova Scotia has 
oscillated between two and three relevant parties, with three parties attaining this status in 
the 1940s and in all general elections since and including 1970.  While there is some 
subjectivity at play when using this method, the Sartori count acknowledges the surge in 
support for, and subsequent decline of, a third party during the 1940s.  The CCF elected 
its first MLAs in 1941, and became the Official Opposition in 1945 as the Conservatives 
were shut out.  PC MLAs were returned to the House of Assembly in 1949, and the CCF 
entered a period of decline, a trend they would not begin to reverse until 1970.
Perhaps not as precise as statistical methods at identifying parties on the precipice 
of government, the Sartori method ultimately provides a count of parties deemed to have 
an important impact on the direction of partisan competition within a polity.   For the 
purpose of responding to the central research question, the Sartori count demonstrates the 
persistent  presence of  a  third party with enough legislative representation to  have an 
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important impact on the provincial party system, so much so that it influenced interparty 
competition at election time, particularly between the governing parties, and it provided 
minority  governments  with  alternatives  when  they  needed  to  pass  confidence  votes. 
More to the point, the Sartori demonstrates the parameters of the party system in Nova 
Scotia by establishing the number of political parties that are relevant for governing and 
for campaigning during elections.  Put another way, the Sartori count sets out the capacity 
of the party system at a given moment in time by deciding upon the number of possible 
governing parties in addition to smaller parties with the ability to influence the policies 
and performances of the larger ones.
Effective Number of Electoral Parties
Figures 4.06 and 4.07 show the progression of provincial ENEP scores, average or 
mean riding ENEP, and the difference between the two in Nova Scotia between 1933 and 
2017.  To be clear, the former graph shows ENEP as calculated by the Laakso-Taagepera 
formula, the latter by the Golosov formula.  Once again, upon review of the data and the 
graphs,  several  trends  became  apparent.   First,  corroborating  the  observations  of 
academics like Beck (1954, 1976, 1978), Bellamy (1976), Carbert (2016), Hyson (1973), 
and Jenson (1976), Nova Scotia general election results up to 1970 produced an average 
Golosov ENP of 2.04, and an average Laakso-Taagepera ENP of 2.25.  In other words, 
the “traditional” voting habits of Nova Scotians are supported by ENP scores that suggest 
the domination of two parties over provincial political competition, inferring that third 
parties were weak and lacked significant power or representation throughout most of the 
province's history.
77
The second apparent trend is the emergence of a two-party-plus system in general 
elections between 1974 and 1993.  The average provincial ENEP for the period from 
1974  to  1993  are  2.27  and  2.64,  for  the  Golosov  and  Laakso-Taagepera  indices 
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respectively.  (The data from which these periodic averages are calculated can be found 
in Table 4.4 in the Appendix.)  This growth for the third party can be seen in Figure 4.06, 
as  the  Laakso-Taagepera  provincial  ENEP  crosses  and  stays  above  the  2.5  mark. 
Golosov ENEP, while calculated with a more conservative formula in that it discounts 
smaller parties to a greater degree, still shows an upward trend in the number of parties  
during the 1970s and 1980s.  Taken together, the data is showing the growth in support 
for a third party, up to a point where a sizable portion of the electorate routinely votes for 
them and is able to elect some MLAs.  We know from the general election data that a 
doubling of popular support for the third-place NSNDP can be observed between the 
elections of 1970 and 1974.  Moreover,  that growth in support was consolidated and 
maintained by the party through the five subsequent general  elections,  averaging just 
under 16 per cent support in elections between 1974 and 1993, and electing between one 
and four MLAs each time.  Although the NSNDP never seriously challenged for power 
during this period, they did emerge as a persistent political force which explains why we 
see heightened provincial ENEP scores for this period.
Thirdly, and most importantly, a spike in provincial ENEP is observed beginning 
in 1998.  For the general election held that year, Laakso-Taagepera ENEP was 3.001, and 
Golosov  ENEP was  2.9.   Although  there  is  a  greater  variation  in  Golosov  figures 
observed  during  the  period  between  1998  and  2017,  both  indices  demonstrate  that 
significant growth in the third party's support has occurred in the five years between the 
1993 and 1998 campaigns.  Overall, the average provincial ENEP for the most recent 
period is 2.98 and 2.69 for the Laakso-Taagepera and Golosov formulae, respectively. 
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Only the Laakso-Taagepera index produced ENEP scores at or slightly above three, and it 
did so over four consecutive elections, only dipping below that threshold in 2009 and 
2013 because of the election of large majority governments.  These ENEP scores are 
substantiated by the state of recent political competition in Nova Scotia:  between 1998 
and 2013, the three main parties each won at  least  one election,  formed the Official 
Opposition,  and sat  as  the third party in  the Legislature.   In  other  words,  provincial 
politics  in  Nova  Scotia  have  become  highly  competitive  with  approximately  three 
effective parties competing in volatile general elections, just as the ENEP trendlines have 
illustrated.
Riding-level  ENEP data  also  yielded  some  surprising  numbers,  with  average 
ENEP riding results exhibiting tendencies similar to the provincial ENEP such as a steady 
increase over time.  Riding ENEP, as Duverger would have suspected, is generally lower 
than provincial ENEP.  Average and median riding ENEP, which is illustrated in Figures 
4.08 and 4.09 below, certainly track lower than the provincial ENEP for both indices, yet 
the two trace a path over time that is similar to the provincial ENEP.  In most election 
years, median riding ENEP was lower than the average, or mean, which lends support to 
Duverger's claim by demonstrating that, in most cases, ENEP was lower at the riding 
level than it was at the provincial level.  However, pushing back against Duvergerian 
expectations, the difference between provincial ENEP and the mean riding ENEP is quite 
narrow, ranging between 0.2 and 0.5 for both indices.  What that tells us about electoral 
competition in Nova Scotia is that the difference between the provincial level ENEP and 
the average at the riding level is one-half of a party or less, meaning that the heightened 
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partisan competition across Nova Scotia as a whole is occurring in the ridings, too.
Another important finding from riding ENEP is that the median begins to track 
higher  than  the  mean  beginning with  the  1998 general  election.   This  indicates  that 
Figure 4.09:  Golosov Mean and Median Riding ENEP
Figure 4.08:  Laakso-Taagepera Mean and Median Riding ENEP
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halfway point between the extremes in riding ENEP outcomes is tracking higher than the 
average, demonstrating that riding contests are actually more competitive in most cases.
Figure 4.11:  Distribution of Golosov Riding ENEP Outcomes, 1998 – 2017
Figure 4.10:  Distribution of Laakso-Taagepera Riding ENEP Outcomes, 1998 – 2017
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In  Figures  4.10  and  4.11,  we  see  the  distribution  of  Laakso-Taagepera  and 
Golosov riding ENEP in general elections from 1998 to 2017, during which time there 
were 362 general election riding contests.  Each position along the x axis includes those 
ridings whose ENEP was greater than the previous interval and less than or equal to the 
present interval.  For example, cases included in the bar at the 2.0 position include those 
ridings whose ENEP was greater than 1.90 and less than or equal to 2.00, as ENEP was 
rounded to the hundredth position. In both graphs, there is clearly a tendency toward the 
higher  end  of  the  scale,  particularly  with  Laakso-Taagepera,  with  the  most  frequent 
outcomes occurring between 2.81 and 3,  as seen in Figure 4.10.   The distribution of 
Laakso-Taagepera ENEP outcomes tilts leans rightward on the graph with two-thirds of 
riding ENEP results being greater than 2.51, and one tenth of the same outcomes being 
greater than 3.01.  While the tendency with Golosov is more reserved, as Figure 4.11 
illustrates,  the trend of higher ENEP outcomes remains the same, with the most frequent 
riding ENEP outcomes being those between 2.21 and 2.70, and nearly two-thirds of all 
Golosov outcomes being greater than 2.11.
The more recent riding ENEP outcomes appear more stark when compared to 
general election riding contests held between 1933 and 1993, which are shown below in 
Figures 4.12 and 4.13.  In contrast with more recent elections, the ENEP outcomes in 
earlier elections make it obvious that partisan competition was more concentrated among 
two parties,  with ENEP scores between 1.91 and 2 being by far the most commonly 
occurring.   Again,  Laakso-Taagepera  ENEP outcomes  tend  to  be  higher  than  those 
calculated using the Golosov formula, with the former suggesting more robust partisan 
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competition than the latter, with Golosov ENEP suggesting less competitive races.
As Duverger claimed that plurality elections tend to come down to two choices, 
Figure 4.12:  Laakso-Taagepera Riding ENEP Outcomes, 1933 – 1993
Figure 4.13:  Golosov Riding ENEP Outcomes, 1933 – 1993
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he would have a strong case to make if he were discussing Nova Scotia general election 
contests up to the 1990s, as the previous graphs all demonstrate.  That said, it is plain to 
see that the nature of riding-level competition has significantly changed during the post-
1998 period relative to earlier general elections.  Tripartisan competition is much more 
common over the last  two decades than at  any other point in Nova Scotia's electoral 
history.   Even  the  spread  of  the  outcomes  shows  the  range  of  competition  that  is 
happening across the province.  Whereas during earlier eras a safe assumption was that 
the  two  primary  contenders  in  a  given  riding  were  the  Liberal  and  Progressive 
Conservative parties, since 1998 those two parties have had to contend with a stronger 
and more relevant challenge from New Democratic candidates.  The competitive dynamic 
in  those ridings where ENEP is  lower has  also changed:   along with the Liberal-PC 
contests  that  have  traditionally  occurred,  there  are  now numerous  ridings  where  the 
primary competitors are LPNS and NSNDP candidates, or NSNDP and PCNS candidates. 
Even as the number of 'effective' parties in the ridings has steadily grown, in those ridings 
where there has not been increase in ENEP, the nature of competition has changed.
If one were to make a cautious observation about what riding ENEP data after 
1998 reveals, reflecting here on the Golosov index, then it appears that something akin to 
a two-party-plus system is happening at the riding level with median riding ENEP sitting 
at 2.3 over the last seven elections, reaching a peak of 2.38 in 2017.  This is in stark 
contrast to the traditional two-party system of decades past, as evidenced by the median 
riding ENEP during earlier election years which hewed much closer to two.  More boldly, 
relying on information from the Laakso-Taagepera index,  which is  the standard ENP 
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measure in the political science literature, one observes at the riding level something that 
lies between a two-and-a-half and a three-party system.  These figures go against the 
notion that, at the riding level, the number of parties would be winnowed down to two, as 
Duverger believed.  On the contrary, the Laakso-Taagepera numbers suggest that, as is 
found at the provincial level, competition in the ridings is much more robust than would 
typically be expected.
Rae's Fractionalization Index
Succinctly, fractionalization measures the likelihood that any two voters will have 
chosen to vote for different parties at an election.  With no fractionalization (Fe = 0), all 
voters  would  be  casting  ballots  for  the  same  party;  conversely,  under  conditions  of 
hyperfractionalization  (Fe =  1),  all  voters  would  be voting  for  separate  parties.   The 
difference in Fe between 0.0 and 0.5 indicates the gap between one-party domination and 
two-party competition.  The difference in  Fe between 0.5 and 0.67 would indicate the 
distance between two-party and three-party competition.  Therefore, an  Fe outcome of 
0.33 is a less significant indicator of the state of partisan competition than an Fe outcome 
of 0.67, even as both are the same distance (0.17) away from an Fe of 0.5, which is the 
baseline measure for a two-party system.
As Rae notes, fractionalization is limited by the number of parties in competition 
(1967:  54).   Across  the  24  general  elections  under  examination  here,  the  number  of 
participating parties has ranged from a low of three16 to a high of six17.  That said, the data 
shown in Figure 4.14 illustrates the trend in fractionalization of votes and seats over time, 
16 Only three parties contested the general elections of 1937, 1941, 1949, and 1963.
17 There were six parties counted as participants in the general elections of 2003 and 2017.  It must be 
noted that independent candidates were counted here as a party group for analytical purposes when, in 
reality, only five registered political parties contested these two general elections.
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and the results are revealing.  With regard to seats, we can easily pick out the oscillations 
between large majority governments—when the line craters towards the low end of the 
index—and closer, more evenly apportioned seat outcomes.  When it comes to periods of 
majority government, we can see that large majority governments in the 1940s and the 
1960s would cause the Fp outcome to dip below 0.2, whereas later majority governments
—those elected between 1974 and 1993—would cause the Fp  outcome to dip to slightly 
below  0.4.   More  to  the  point,  of  the  four  elections  that  have  resulted  in  majority 
governments since 1998, none of these outcomes has caused Fp to dip below 0.5, and the 
actual Fp outcomes have remained closer to 0.6 during this time.  In other words, majority 
legislatures in much of the 20th century resulted in seat distributions that heavily favoured 
the government, whereas closer to the 21st century, majority governments in Nova Scotia 
faced a more equitable match in the size of the opposition caucuses.
If we shift our gaze to the final segments of both lines—resulting from elections 
Figure 4.14:  Fractionalization of Votes and Seats in Nova Scotia, 1933 – 2017
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happening after 1998—we see that both Fe and Fp  remain within the range between 0.5 
and 0.67 which reflects the increased electoral and partisan competition, as well as the 
more evenly distributed legislatures that have been elected over the last two decades in 
Nova Scotia.  During the most recent majority governments for instance, the opposition 
party  caucuses  have  been  more  evenly  matched  relative  to  one  another,  and  when 
combined, they more equitably match the majority government caucus which they both 
face  (see  Table  4.5  in  the  Appendix  for  data).   Simply  put,  when  looking  at 
fractionalization of seats in the most recent era, we are seeing a period reflective of two- 
to three-party parliamentary competition.
The breakdown of votes in plurality elections are not always reflected in the seat 
count, and that is no different here.  Notwithstanding the mounting evidence that, in terms 
of votes, Nova Scotia has been in a three-party system for the better part of two decades, 
the seat count—and calculations based off same—is not exactly the same; however, as 
seat counts and related measures track lower than votes and vote-based measures, it is 
evident that they both display similar trends and tendencies.   Essentially,  elections in 
Nova Scotia  have grown more competitive over  time;  have incorporated at  least  one 
additional 'effective' party; and, have experienced three distinct periods or eras that were 
defined by the level  of  competition  therein,  all  of  which  is  clear  from the  outcomes 
produced by Rae's fractionalization index.
Combined Vote Share and Relative Proportions
Figure 4.15 shows the combined vote share for the first- and second-place parties 
as a percentage of valid votes cast in Nova Scotia general elections since 1933.  As with 
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previous measures, three distinct time periods visibly emerge from the data.  First, from 
1933  through  1970,  the  combined  vote  for  the  two  largest  parties—throughout  this 
period, the two were the Liberal and Progressive Conservative parties—ranged from a 
low of 86.22 percent in 1945 to a high of 98.48 percent in 1933, and over this period, the 
combined vote total was generally at or very near to the 90 percent interval.  From 1974 
through 1993, we see the combined vote share decline to a point where it consistently 
ranged in the low to mid 80s, indicating that the two strongest electoral parties—again, 
these were the LPNS and PCNS—had ceded some ground to  third parties,  with this 
support largely finding its way to the NSNDP.
After 1998, the combined vote share again declines notably in the range of two-
thirds to three-quarters of the popular vote.  Unlike in previous years, however, the two 
largest electoral parties alternated throughout  this  latter  period:   the Liberal  vote was 
counted  here  five  times,  as  were  the  votes  received  by  the  New  Democrats;  votes 
Figure 4.15:  Combined Vote Share for 1st and 2nd Parties in Nova Scotia Elections
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received by the Progressive Conservatives were considered on four occasions.  As the 
general  decline  in  the  combined  vote  share  of  the  two  largest  parties  indicates,  and 
supplemented by the alternation in partisan competition in the period after 1998, there 
was a corresponding rise in support for a third party.  If one were to add the combined 
vote share for the three largest parties after 1998, one would find numbers similar to 
those of the combined share of the two largest parties in the 1930s, which gives credence 
to the point that the decline in the two-party combined vote was matched closely by a 
corresponding rise in the vote for a single third party.
Finally,  the proportion of the votes of the first and second parties is measured 
relative to that of the third, the results of which can be seen in Figure 4.16 above.  For 
this, the third party's vote is set at a constant of one, in effect determining how many 
votes the two largest  electoral parties  received for every one cast  for the third party. 
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Additionally, these figures do not correspond directly to a particular party, as the three 
main parties have finished first, second, and third in elections during the period being 
measured.  The third party line in Figure 4.16, for example, does not correspond directly 
with results for the NSNDP; rather, the third party line matches with the results of the 
party that received the third largest number of votes in a particular election.
The three different patterns of competition are again noticeable here, with the data 
for first period from 1933 through 1970 looking rather volatile as it appears the graph 
above; however, we know from our earlier look at election data that this swing comes 
from the third-place party growing its vote share from about one percent to about ten 
percent over five general elections, before receding back to the lower single digits over 
the six subsequent general elections.  Otherwise, this period is marked by the closeness of 
the first and second parties to each other, and the gaping distance between them and the 
third place finisher,  which implies that  the top two parties were competing with one 
another and were unfazed by any challenge coming from elsewhere.
The second period from the 1970s through the 1990s shows a more competitive 
electoral landscape, albeit one where the two largest parties are able to attain two to four 
votes for every one received by the third party.  The vote of the third party nearly doubled 
between the general elections of 1970 and 1974, and those gains were consolidated with 
repeated vote shares in the mid-teens recorded for it over six election cycles.  While the 
two largest parties still received the lion's share of the vote, by this point in time, their 
rate of vote collection relative to the third party was not as significant as it had been 
historically.   This signals a heightened level of competition,  though with the primary 
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parties still some distance ahead of their third place counterpart, the data reveals that the 
period from the 1970s through the mid 1990s was marked by a two-party-plus system.
In 1998, there was a significant increase in the support for the third-place party, 
and along with it became a series of very competitive elections.  In the seven general 
elections since 1998, the first and second parties received more than a single vote but less 
than two votes per vote received by the third party.  As seen in Figure 4.16, the parties 
have never been closer to each other in terms of their ability to amass votes.  This means 
that subtle shifts in the whims of the electorate could have had significant impacts on 
election outcomes.  For the first time in Nova Scotia, a third party could conceivably be 
elected to government—as was the case with the PCNS when they went from third party 
in 1998 to a majority government in 1999.  Overall, the last two decades have clearly 
shown a tendency toward increased competition among the three largest parties in Nova 
Scotia,  with  no  one  party  coming  to  dominate  the  period,  and  with  all  parties 
experiencing boom and bust cycles.  Still, the electoral booms experienced recently by 
the parties have been less potent—in terms of margins of victory and seats won by the 
governing parties—and the busts have been less austere, with the parties finishing third 
typically able to win at least a half-dozen seats with between a fifth and a quarter of the  
popular vote.  Altogether, the data are clearly testifying to the presence of a three-party 
system in Nova Scotia that has been in place for a little more than twenty years.
Discussion
Reflecting of the data above, several themes materialize.  From CRA's polling 
data,  it  appears  that  the  consistency of  tripartisan  competitiveness  over  the  last  two 
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decades endures between elections.  This is important because it shows that the support 
received by the NSNDP at the ballot box was not simply the product of a good campaign 
or a surge in support over several weeks during an election period.  Rather, the polling 
data reveals that the NSNDP maintained a competitive position relative to its two primary 
rivals  by  consolidating  the  support  it  received  and  sustaining  it  between  elections. 
Moreover, as reflected in the leadership data, having a popular leader helped the NSNDP 
maintain its competitiveness and helped to position it as a viable governing alternative: 
the  party formed the  official  opposition  from 1999 through 2009,  its  leader  was the 
preferred choice for premier among poll respondents, and, when voters were looking for 
change  in  the  late  2000s,  the  conditions  were  in  place  for  the  NSNDP to  take  full 
advantage of the moment.
Descriptively, we see some critical components of the NSNDP's breakthrough as a 
competitive entity.  First, in the initial years in the polling series, roughly between 1990 
and 1995, the party's support fluctuated between 15 and 30 percent, and while that did not 
lead to a breakthrough in 1993, it showed that the party had more than a token presence 
in  the  province,  something  that  had  already  been  indicated  in  the  election  returns. 
Moreover, after the change from a Conservative to a Liberal government in 1993, and as 
the  Liberal  government's  popularity  began  to  decline  shortly  thereafter,  the  primary 
beneficiary of that decline was actually the NSNDP.  This reflects a point made by Pinard 
(1975)  that,  when  a  newly  elected  government  experiences  a  sudden  decline  in  its 
fortunes, the electorate, rather than returning to a previous and still unpopular governing 
party, will entertain an alternative in the third party.  As the CRA data shows, the NSNDP 
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was able to exploit the vulnerability of the LPNS and PCNS in the mid-1990s by adding 
new supporters and consolidating its electoral gains, which positioned the party on an 
equal footing with the traditional governing parties for the first time.  In hindsight, the 
1998 election appears less like a sudden breakthrough for the NSNDP, and more like the 
realization of a pre-existing trend in Nova Scotia's electoral politics.  Its emergence in 
1998 was a critical step in the NSNDP's trajectory from an also-ran to a government-in-
waiting, which was then followed up over the subsequent decade by its tenure as official 
opposition  and  the  experience  that  brings  to  the  party,  its  leader,  and  its  MLAs;  by 
making and securing its gains over several elections, as confirmed by the polling data; 
and, by having a leader whose popularity helped to entrench it, in the minds of voters, as 
a legitimate governing alternative.
Speaking of leaders, the most significant change for the NSNDP was actually its 
selection of Alexa McDonough as leader in 1980, which marked the first time a woman 
had been chosen to lead a major political party in Canada.  She was also her party's first 
leader to hail from outside Cape Breton.  In 1981, McDonough's first provincial election 
as  leader,  the  party lost  all  of  its  seats  in  Cape  Breton—former  NSNDP MLA Paul 
MacEwan was re-elected as  an independent—after  hitting a  high water  mark of four 
members in 1978.  The distribution of votes and seats in Cape Breton County are shown 
below in Figures 4.17 and 4.18, respectively.  Despite the setback in the party's traditional 
territory, McDonough won in her Halifax area riding, which represented the first time the 
party won a seat on the mainland.  To demonstrate McDonough's impact on her party's 
performance, particularly as a Halifax-based leader, the distribution of votes and seats in 
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Halifax  County are  illustrated  in  Figures  4.19  and  4.20,  respectively,  which  show a 
marked increase in NSNDP support in the county in McDonough's first election as leader, 
as well as her party's first seat in the area.
During her 14-year tenure as leader, the McDonough-led NSNDP elected several 
Figure 4.17:  Distribution of the popular vote (%) in Cape Breton County since 1933
Figure 4.18:  Distribution of seats within Cape Breton County since 1933
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members from the Halifax and Sackville areas,  as well as an MLA in Kings County, 
situated about an hour's drive from Halifax.  The party enjoyed a small breakthrough in 
and around Halifax, laying down markers for the party's future pathway to power, but it  
would remain shut out of Cape Breton for the entirety of McDonough's leadership.
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The importance of the geographical shift in the NSNDP's electoral base—indeed, 
the overall importance of Halifax County in provincial elections—is made starkly clear in 
Figure 4.21, which shows the number of registered electors in each county over time. 
Even into the 1940s, the electoral weight of Halifax County was similar to that of Cape 
Breton County, with both being home to about 60,000 voters each.  In the years following 
the end of the Second World War, however, the number of electors in Halifax County 
began to grow at a rate faster than any other county in Nova Scotia, a rate that accelerated 
in the mid- to late-1960s and thereafter18.  By comparison, the number of electors in the 
other counties either remained stagnant or increased at  gradual rates17 (for population 
data, see Storring, 2015).  It is crystal clear, then, that for any party to be competitive in 
Nova Scotia, it would need to attract a significant number of voters and win a number of 
contests in the Halifax region if electoral success provincewide is to be achieved.
18 I collected and organized elector data from each of the published Election Reports from 1933 to 2017,  
which are available online from ENS at https://electionsnovascotia.ca/election-data/past-results.
Figure 4.21:  Number of electors by county since 1933
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Chapter 5:  Conclusion
Let us return to the central research question in this thesis, that being how the 
historically third-place NSNDP emerged as a viable governing alternative alongside Nova 
Scotia's two traditional parties, the Liberals and Progressive Conservatives.  It is clear 
from the data presented in the previous chapter that the dynamics of partisan competition 
in  the  province  experienced  a  definitive  change  in  the  late  1990s,  with  the  general 
election  of  1998  serving  as  the  pivotal  event  in  which  certain  trends  were  realized. 
Among these trends  were the gradual  rise  in  popular  support  for  the NSNDP, which 
began in the early 1970s provincewide (see Figure 4.01) and, more importantly, in the 
1980s in the Halifax area (see Figure 4.19), which is home to two-fifths of all voters and 
two-fifths  of the seats  in  the House of Assembly.   Prior to  this,  the NSNDP drew a 
disproportionate  amount  of  its  votes—and  all  of  its  seats—from  the  industrial 
communities of eastern Cape Breton County, an area whose population level has either 
been stagnant or in decline since the mid-20th century (for electors, see Figure 4.21).  The 
industries that once dominated places like Sydney (steel), Glace Bay, and New Waterford 
(coal) have long disappeared, as have the forces of labour that powered the NSNDP and 
its predecessor, the CCF, to electoral victory in the county's constituencies.
It is hard to overstate the importance of the geographic shift in the NSNDP's base 
of support because it  involved more than moving from one region to another;  it  also 
entailed a shift in the demographic of the party's voters.  Halifax is home to many public 
servants in both the provincial and federal governments, being that it is both a provincial 
capital  and  a  regional  hub  for  federal  services.   There  are  several  universities  and 
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institutions  of  higher  learning  within  Halifax,  which  have  a  strong  research  and 
development  capacity;  and,  Halifax  has  a  booming  private  sector  in  areas  such  as 
aerospace, oil and gas, retail, shipbuilding, and transportation.  Many of the individuals 
who work in the Halifax region are younger, urban, progressive professionals, and it is to 
these people that the NSNDP turned for support from the 1980s onward.  Indeed, the 
present electoral dynamic in the Halifax Regional Municipality19 is not unlike those of 
other major urban centres across Canada, like Ottawa, Toronto, Winnipeg, or Vancouver, 
in which inner city ridings typically elect left-leaning candidates from parties like the 
Liberals  or  New  Democrats;  where  suburban  areas  are  often  hotly  contested  races 
featuring  multiple  parties  and  candidates;  and,  where  exurban  districts  tilt  heavily 
towards candidates with a conservative inclination.  Whether or not NSNDP strategists 
were aware of Halifax's increasing sophistication as a result of its metropolitanization is 
beside the point; what matters is that the party was well positioned at a time and in a 
place it needed to be in order to take advantage of the growing number of voters who 
would be receptive to a left-wing alternative to the two traditional parties, a move that 
began the process of growing the NSNDP beyond a small, regionally-isolated caucus of 
two to four members.
In parliamentary systems with single-member plurality elections, leaders matter, 
and that point is also driven home in the data.  As a party, the NSNDP has tended to 
flourish in areas from which it drew its leaders, and for most of the 20 th century, that 
meant success in eastern Cape Breton.  In an election year in which the Liberals were 
19 In 1995, the cities of Halifax and Dartmouth, and all towns and communities within Halifax County,  
with the exception of First Nations reserves, amalgamated to form a single-tier regional municipality.
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electorally dominant, for instance, the regional strength of the CCF in 1945 allowed it to 
claim  victory  in  two  ridings,  form the  official  opposition,  and  stop  the  LPNS  from 
winning 100 percent of the seats.  As long as the CCF and later the NSNDP remained the 
voice  of  Cape Breton coal  miners  and steel  workers,  it  could  be assured  with some 
modest  legislative  representation;  however,  that  also  meant  that  party  candidates 
elsewhere in Nova Scotia were virtually assured of defeat.
The election of Alexa McDonough to the party leadership in 1980 changed all 
that.   She took the helm of the NSNDP at a time in which it  had been embroiled in 
infighting among the Cape Breton and mainland wings of the party, specifically involving 
MLA Paul  MacEwan,  his  labelling  of  mainland  NDP members  as  “ayatollahs”  and 
“Trotskyites,” and his eventual expulsion from party ranks (Yaffe, 1980a; Yaffe, 1980b; 
Harris, 1981).  She led the party into the 1981 general election, and although she had the 
distinctions of winning the NSNDP's first seat in mainland Nova Scotia and being the 
first female party leader in the province's history, the party was routed in its traditional 
Cape Breton heartland, as Figures 4.17 and 4.18 illustrate, and the McDonough-led party 
would never win a seat there.  Conversely, with McDonough at the helm, the NSNDP 
would go on to overperform in Halifax County, beating the party's provincial popular 
vote by about 10 percent in each general election with her as leader.  Moreover, the party 
would add a second Halifax-area seat in 1984 and, in a 1991 by-election, future party 
leader Robert Chisholm—who was NSNDP leader during its 1998 breakthrough—would 
be elected to replace the former PCNS premier John Buchanan in the riding of Halifax 
Atlantic.  Following the 1998 election, the New Democrats came to dominate vote-rich 
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Halifax, taking a plurality of both votes and seats in the region for 15 years until the first 
NSNDP  government  was  defeated  in  2013.   Even  at  present,  with  the  party  still 
recovering from its defeat six years ago and mired in third place, it still draws the bulk of  
its support, and all but one of its seats20, from Halifax County.
While it was said upon her resignation as party leader that her “attempt to realign 
Nova Scotia politics was not overwhelmingly successful” (Sheppard, 1994), in hindsight, 
McDonough's tenure as party leader clearly set the stage for the party's breakthrough just 
a few years later, during both the federal election of 1997—in which the McDonough-led 
federal NDP won six of 11 seats in Nova Scotia—and the provincial election of 1998, 
when her successor, Robert Chisholm, led the party to a 19-seat tie with the governing 
Liberals.  One of McDonough's signature issues, that of patronage, an issue she fought 
passionately against in a province that had grown accustomed to changing significant 
parts of the public service alongside changes of government, had come to a head in the 
1990s and created an opening for the party to campaign on its track record on the issue 
(see  also  MacLeod,  2006;  Aucoin  and  Goodyear-Grant,  2002;  Pond,  2008;  Spafford, 
1981; Henderson, 2008).  Furthermore,  the NSNDP was fortunate to be in a position 
where  it  was  neither  of  the  two traditional  parties.   As  Pinard  (1975)  theorized,  the 
electorate in a two-party system, having recently defeated one of the traditional parties 
and having quickly soured on the other,  instead turned to  the third party as the only 
reasonable alternative.   While McDonough may not have seen the realignment of the 
20 In the 2017 general election, the NSNDP won two seats outside of the Halifax area.  The party lost one  
of those two MLAs when Lenore Zann, who represented the Truro area, announced in June 2019 that 
she was seeking a federal Liberal nomination for the 2019 federal election (see Prentiss, 2019).  That  
same month, the NSNDP lost a by-election in Sackville to the PCNS candidate, Steve Craig, in a seat it 
had held for 34 consecutive years (Laroche, 2019).
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provincial political landscape during her time as NSNDP leader, she certainly positioned 
the party to take advantage of the situation that confronted it in the mid- to late-1990s, 
opening up Nova Scotia's party system into a more competitive one and positioning the 
NSNDP as a governing alternative to the two old-line parties.
McDonough was held in high regard by the provincial electorate, and while her 
personal popularity failed to translate into a larger number of seats, she cemented the 
party's image as a strong voice of government scrutiny (Sheppard, 1994; Laxer, 1995). 
Moreover, the party benefited from a couple of popular leaders who helped consolidate 
the party's support base in Halifax and increase its presence elsewhere in the province. 
Robert Chisholm, who succeeded McDonough in 1996, proved to be a genial and well-
liked leader of the party (see DeMont, 1999), and he led the NSNDP to its two best 
results—in 1998 and 1999—in its history up to that point.  Chisholm stepped down from 
the party leadership in 2000, shortly after the 1999 election during which the revelation 
of a past drunk driving conviction scuttled his chances at leading the NSNDP to its first 
victory.  Still, under Chisholm's leadership, the NSNDP cemented its position of strength 
in  the  Halifax  area  and  retained  the  position  of  official  opposition.   After  Helen 
MacDonald's brief run as party leader from 2000 to 2001, Darrell Dexter—who was first 
elected as an MLA during the party's 1998 breakthrough—was chosen as party leader, 
and his down-to-earth demeanor endeared him to the province's electorate (see Kimber, 
2009).  Indeed, CRA polling data shows (see Figure 4.04) that Dexter was routinely one 
of the most popular political party leaders in the province during the years he helmed the 
NSNDP, a trend that doubtless helped the party as it sought to be elected to government. 
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Ultimately, in June 2009, Dexter led the party to power for the first and only time in its 
history.
To recap, in response to the central research question of how the NSNDP emerged 
as a viable governing alternative to the two traditional parties, one has to consider several 
factors which, taken together, linked up to form a pathway to power.  First off, the party 
has maintained a consistent presence on the Nova Scotia political scene since the 1930s, 
first as the CCF and later as the NSNDP.  Over that time, it was able to elect MLAs to the 
House of Assembly, beginning in the 1940s in the industrial towns of Cape Breton before 
the party's base of support shifted to the mainland, specifically the Halifax area, around 
the start of the 1980s.  Having elected MLAs, even in a caucus of two to four members, 
brought to the party a measure of consistency, familiarity, and legitimacy that no other 
small party in Nova Scotia could claim.  Moreover, with popular leaders—McDonough, 
Chisholm, and Dexter are among the most popular leaders of any party the province has 
seen  over  the  last  four  decades—the  party  was  able  to  capitalize  by entrenching  its 
support in its strongholds in the Halifax region and by reaching out to other parts of Nova 
Scotia where the party had always been an afterthought.  Most importantly, however, the 
NSNDP benefitted from being in the right place at the right time.  In the mid-1990s, after  
the electorate  had soured on the traditional  parties  of  government  in  relatively quick 
succession,  the  NSNDP—a  known  entity  with  a  long  history  and  presence  at  the 
provincial level, with a popular leader, and with a base of support in the province's most 
populated region—was in position to take in disillusioned voters who were searching for 
something different yet something new.  By appealing to and engaging with voters in the 
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provincial capital, where a plurality of the electorate resides; by choosing leaders who 
proved popular with electors, in whom Nova Scotians could see a potential premier; and, 
by capitalizing on political events, in particular the misfortunes of the old-line parties, the 
NSNDP was able to evolve from a perennial also-ran and the historical third-party into an 
entity that could legitimately compete to take up the mantle of power.
A Comment on Duverger's Law
The theory underpinning Duverger's Law goes that plurality electoral systems lead 
to  the  development  of  two-party systems,  as  electors  are  wont  to  vote for  victorious 
parties and candidates.  It is important to note that Duverger, when he first published his 
theory in the early 1950s, was developing his theory based upon observations of elections 
primarily in the United Kingdom and the United States.  In the United Kingdom during 
the post-war years, for instance, the Labour party had solidified its position as one of 
Britain's two parties, occupying the left wing of the political spectrum as the primary 
opponent to the Conservatives (see Quinn, 2012).  Concurrently in the United States, 
Democratic  and  Republican  candidates  have  faced  virtually  no  challenge  to  their 
positions as the two dominant parties within the American party system, one which has 
endured since the 19th century (see Chhibber and Kollman, 2004; Hirano and Snyder, Jr., 
2007).  It is not hard to see why Duverger came to see plurality elections as the catalyst 
for two-partism, as the dynamics he observed were as close to pure two-partism as one 
could get.
Times  have  changed,  however,  and so  has  partisan  competition.   In  Political  
Parties, Duverger (1955) remarks that Canadian elections have experienced a modicum 
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of multipartism,  with  the  CCF and Social  Credit  parties  able  to  win  seats  while  the 
Liberal and Progressive Conservative parties win governments.  He chalked the successes 
of those third parties up to regionalism, and he is not wrong in this respect:  regional  
cleavages play a crucial role in explaining the dynamic of electoral competition in Nova 
Scotia, in particular how the wants and needs of voters in heavily populated Halifax, for 
example,  contrast  with  the  wants  and  needs  of  voters  who  live  in  the  remainder  of 
mainland Nova Scotia as well as on Cape Breton Island.  Simply put, voters who live in 
different regions have different, sometimes competing interests, and this has a tendency 
to show up in election results.  That said, geography only partially explains the dynamic. 
What if voters are simply willing to vote for whom they want, as opposed to whom they 
think has the best chance of winning?  The data shown here, specifically the effective 
number of parties data (see Figures 4.06 through 4.11), points to an electorate that will 
vote for parties and candidates that they want, as both provincial and riding level ENP 
demonstrate similar trends by increasing towards three effective parties.
The tendency towards three parties is most surprising when it comes at the riding 
level, as in plurality elections there can be but a single victor yet the electorate seems 
quite  comfortable  dividing  their  votes  among  three  parties,  including  two  that  will 
necessarily lose.  It is hard to say exactly why voters choose to do this, but one may 
deduce that, in close contests where three parties have a viable shot at winning the seat,  
there is little incentive for an elector to vote strategically for another party when one's 
preferred option could possibly win.  Looking at ENP at the riding level over the last 20 
years, as Figures 4.10 and 4.11 illustrate, it is clear that electors are going with their first  
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preferences, whatever the consequences in their district, as the clear majority of cases, 
using  the  Laakso-Taagepera  standard,  exceed  2.5  effective  parties,  with  a  plurality 
occurring near or above three effective parties in the constituencies.  Contrast this with 
the previous six decades of riding-level electoral contests in Nova Scotia, as shown in 
Figures 4.12 and 4.13, where the dominant tendency was two-partism, as Duverger would 
have expected.  Moreover, the last two decades of provincial elections have produced 
outcomes where the first-place party receives less than two votes for every vote received 
by the third party (see Figure 4.16) whereas, in past elections, the first-place party would 
have received several times as many votes as the party finishing third.  All this indicates 
that  the  three  main  parties  are,  at  the  provincial  level,  finishing  much  more  closely 
together  at  the end of election campaigns that they had been historically;  and, at  the 
riding level, the three parties are able to pull their vote and be competitive in a growing 
number of three-way races.
What's Next for Nova Scotia
As I do not possess a crystal ball, nor am I endowed with the ability to see into the 
future,  I  will  not  endeavor  to  predict  the  outcomes  of  future  Nova  Scotia  general 
elections.  There are some interesting trends in opinion polling that could reveal clues as 
to how future electoral contests will unfold.  First, a question:  will Nova Scotia's three-
party system endure?  It stands to reason that it should as none of the major parties seems 
at risk of extinction.  Recent CRA polling shows that the three parties are clustered within 
10 to  15 points of one another  (see Figure 4.03),  with the PCs showing some slight  
momentum in the last several months as newly minted leader Tim Houston hits his stride. 
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The  Liberals,  led  by  premier  Stephen  McNeil,  have  faced  turbulence  of  late  as  his 
government  confronts  persistent  problems  in  health  care  delivery,  particularly  as  it 
pertains to recruitment of doctors and delivery of services in areas beyond Halifax.  The 
NSNDP, meanwhile, are still rebuilding in the aftermath of the party's defeat in 2013, 
with Gary Burrill's steady yet stagnant leadership having brought little momentum to a 
party that once seemed to have it  in spades.   Additionally,  the Green party has hit  a 
historically high level  in opinion polling in  Nova Scotia  just  as their  counterparts  in 
neighbouring New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island experience some considerable 
electoral success.  Still, this thesis has taken the long view on the dynamics of electoral 
competition and the tendencies of the provincial electorate in Nova Scotia, which leads 
one to reasonably presume that any changes to the same are likely to be incremental, and 
that the popularity of minor parties is likely to be anemic and ephemeral.
It is important, though, not to put too much stock in opinion polling as a means of 
predicting  future  election  outcomes.   There  have  been  a  number  of  recent  election 
outcomes—the 2011 Orange Wave that swept across Quebec; Christy Clark's surprise 
2013 re-election in British Columbia; Rachel Notley's stunning 2015 victory in Alberta; 
Donald Trump's election to the American presidency in 2016; the surge in Labour support 
during  the  2017  United  Kingdom general  election—that  would  have  seemed  highly 
unlikely or virtually impossible had the tendencies in pre-election polling held throughout 
the campaign period.  Electoral politics is highly dependent upon events that ultimately 
shape  the  decisions  of  the  electorate,  and events  during  the  campaign  period—when 
voters,  especially  those who do not  follow politics  regularly,  tune  into  politics  more 
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closely—are  critical  for  establishing  those  opinions.   A  poor  (or  positive)  debate 
performance, for instance, or the revelation of some sordid secret can derail the most 
well-laid  of  campaign  plans,  as  can  the  emergence  of  an  event  that  emphasizes  the 
poignancy of a public policy issue, or any number of other occurrences that arise during 
the election period.  So, what will be the outcome of the 2021 election in Nova Scotia? 
Nobody knows the answer to that question with any degree of certainty.  Public opinion 
polling can give us an idea of how the parties are faring in the eyes of the electorate, but 
there is a reason why pollsters ask respondents for their political preference 'if an election 
were held today.'  People change their minds, and events happen all the time that change 
the trajectory of politics.  We will just have to wait and see what happens next.
Other Cases of Interest
While Nova Scotia is an interesting case study in the development of multiparty 
competition within the confines of a plurality electoral system, there are others that merit 
closer  analysis  and  study.   As  previously  mentioned,  the  neighbouring  Maritime 
provinces  are  experiencing the emergence of  new parties  in  the form of  the People's 
Alliance in New Brunswick, and the Greens in both New Brunswick and Prince Edward 
Island.  The outcome of the 2019 election on the Island, for example, bears some striking 
resemblance  to  the  outcome  of  Nova  Scotia's  election  in  1998,  from  three  parties 
finishing  within  six  percentage  points  of  one  another  in  the  popular  vote;  to  the 
breakthrough of a third party and its attainment of official opposition status; to calls for 
cooperation and setting aside partisan squabbles to make minority government work and 
to  avoid  a  snap  election  (see  Madill,  1998;  Campbell,  2019a;  Campbell,  2019b). 
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However, unlike in Nova Scotia where the NSNDP had maintained a persistent presence 
for decades, the PEI Greens contested their first general election in 2007, a mere twelve 
years ago.  New Brunswick's Greens are even more 'green', having only contested their 
first  general  election  in  2010.   With  some  convincing  parallels  and  some  important 
differences among them, the recent dynamics of electoral competition in the Maritime 
provinces present some case studies that are worth a closer look, especially if one were to 
use the analytical tools employed in this thesis.
109
Bibliography
Allan, James P., and Richard Vengroff.  2009.  “The 2007 Elections in Québec and the 
Future of the Provincial Party System.”  Quebec Studies 47:  119-39.
Aucoin, Peter.  1972.  “The 1970 Nova Scotia provincial election:  some observations on 
recent party performance and electoral support.”  Journal of Canadian Studies 
7(3):  25-35.
Aucoin, Peter, and Elizabeth Goodyear-Grant.  2002.  “Designing a merit-based process 
for  appointing  boards  of  ABCs:   Lessons  from  the  Nova  Scotia  reform 
experience.”  Canadian Public Administration 45(3):  301-27.
Beck, J.  Murray.   1954.  “The Party System in Nova Scotia.”  Canadian Journal of  
Economics and Political Science 20(4):  514-30.
Beck, J. Murray.  1976.  “Elections.”  In The Provincial Political Systems, eds. David J. 
Bellamy,  Jon H.  Pammett,  and Donald  C.  Rowat.   Agincourt,  ON:  Methuen 
Publications.
Beck,  J.  Murray.  1978.   “Nova  Scotia:   Tradition  and Conservatism.”   In  Canadian 
Provincial Politics (2nd Edition), ed. Martin Robin.  Scarborough, ON:  Prentice-
Hall.
Bélanger, Éric.  2009.  “The 2008 Provincial Election in Quebec.”  Canadian Political 
Science Review 3(1):  93-99.
Bellamy, David J., Jon H. Pammett, and Donald C. Rowat, eds.,  The Provincial Political  
Systems.  1976.  Agincourt, ON:  Methuen Publications.
Bellamy, David J.  1976.  “The Atlantic Provinces.”  In The Provincial Political Systems, 
eds. David J. Bellamy, Jon H. Pammett, and Donald C. Rowat.  Agincourt, ON:  
Methuen Publications.
Benoit, Kenneth.  2006.  “Duverger's Law and the Study of Electoral Systems.”  French 
Politics 4:  69-83.
Benoit, Kenneth.  2007.  “Electoral Laws as Practical Consequences:  Explaining the 
Origins and Change of Electoral Institutions.”  Annual Review of Political Science 
10:  363-90.
Bittner, Amanda.  2010.  “Personality Matters:  The Evaluation of Party Leaders in 
Canadian Elections.”  In Voting Behavior in Canada, eds. Cameron D. Anderson 
and Laura B. Stephenson.  Vancouver, BC:  UBC Press.
Bittner, Amanda.  2018.  “Leaders always mattered:  The persistence of personality in 
Canadian elections.”  Electoral Studies 54:  297-302.
Blais, André.  1973.  “Third Parties in Canadian Provincial Politics.”  Canadian Journal 
of Political Science 6(3):  422-38.
Blais, André.  2002.  “Why Is there So Little Strategic Voting in Canadian Plurality Rule 
Elections?”  Political Studies 50:  445-54.
Blais, André, and Marc-André Bodet.  2006.  “How Do Voters Form Expectations about 
the Parties' Chances of Winning the Election?” Social Science Quarterly 87(3):  
477-93.
Blais, André, Richard Nadeau, Elisabeth Gidengil, and Neil Nevitte.  2001.  “Measuring 
strategic voting in plurality elections.”  Electoral Studies 20:  343-52.
110
Blais, André, Robert Young, and Martin Turcotte.  2005.  “Direct or indirect?  Assessing 
two approaches to the measurement of strategic voting.”  Electoral Studies 24:  
163-76.
Bowler, Shaun, and David J. Lanoue.  1992.  “Strategic and Protest Voting for Third 
Parties:  The Case of the Canadian NDP.”  The Western Political Quarterly 45(2):  
485-99.
Cairns, Alan C.  1968.  “The Electoral System and the Party System in Canada, 1921-
1965.”  Canadian Journal of Political Science 1(1):  55-80.
Cameron, Silver Donald.  1998.  “Canaries in the east:  The success of the NDP in 
Tuesday's election has implications for the future of Canadian politics.”  The 
Globe and Mail (Toronto), March 27:  A19.
Campbell, Kerry.  2019.  “King committed to co-operation because 'nobody's interested 
in going to the polls immediately'.”  CBC Prince Edward Island (Charlottetown, 
PEI), April 29.  https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/prince-edward-island/pei-pc-
minority-government-1.5112909 (accessed July 28, 2019).
Campbell, Kerry.  2019.  “Greens propose ground rules for 3 parties in minority 
government.”  CBC Prince Edward Island (Charlottetown, PEI), June 3.  
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/prince-edward-island/pei-green-party-draft-
agreement-1.5160514 (accessed July 28, 2019).
Canadian Press, The.  2015.  “Nova Scotia government balks at fixed election date.”  
CBC Nova Scotia (Halifax, NS), April 8.  https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-
scotia/nova-scotia-government-balks-at-fixed-election-date-1.3025236 (accessed 
September 20, 2019).
Carbert, Louise.  2016.  “Nova Scotia.”  In Big Worlds:  Politics and Elections in the 
Canadian Provinces and Territories, ed. Jared J. Wesley.  Toronto, ON:  
University of Toronto Press.
Carty, R. Kenneth.  1985.  “The Electoral Boundary Revolution in Canada.”  American 
Review of Canadian Studies 15(3):  273-87.
Casal Bértoa, Fernando, and Zsolt Enyedi.  2014.  “Party system closure and openness:  
Conceptualization, operationalization, and validation.”  Party Politics 22(3):  265-
77.
Chan, Cheryl.  2019.  “B.C. Greens to work on identity following defeat in Nanaimo.”  
Vancouver Sun (Vancouver, BC), January 31.  
https://vancouversun.com/news/local-news/b-c-greens-to-work-on-identity-
following-defeat-in-nanaimo (accessed June 14, 2019).
Chezenko, Griffyn G.  2017.  “Effective Number of Parties in Nova Scotia.”  Mapping 
Politics 8: 1-13.
Chhibber, Pradeep K., and Ken Kollman.  2004.  The Formation of National Party 
Systems.  Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press.
Clutterbuck, Peter W.  1973.  “Third Parties Provincially.”  In Provincial Government 
and Politics, ed. Donald C. Rowat.  Ottawa, ON:  Dept. of Political Science, 
Carleton University.
111
Coffin, Mark.  2013.  “2013 Nova Scotia Election Results Unpacked.”  Springtide 
Collective (Halifax, NS), October 17.  https://springtidengo.wpengine.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/10/2013-Election-Results-Unpacked-Spencers-Update-
2p.pdf (accessed June 13, 2019).
Colomer, Josep M.  2005.  “It's Parties That Choose Electoral Systems (or, Duverger's 
Laws Upside Down).”  Political Studies 53:  1-21.
Cox, Gary W.  1997.  Making Votes Count:  Strategic Coordination in the World's 
Electoral Systems.  Cambridge, UK:  Cambridge University Press.
Cox, Kevin.  1993.  “Nova Scotia Liberals romp into power; Cameron says he'll resign as 
Tory support crumbles.”  The Globe and Mail (Toronto), May 26:  A1.
DeMont, John.  1999.  “Chissy's Challenge:  Can Robert Chisholm's NDP unseat the 
Nova Scotia Liberals?”  Maclean's (Toronto), July 19.  
https://archive.macleans.ca/article/1999/7/19/chissys-challenge#!&pid=14 
(accessed July 28, 2019).
Desserud, Don.  2019.  “The complex story of the PEI election.”  Policy Options, May 3.  
https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/may-2019/the-complex-story-of-the-pei-
election/ (accessed May 6, 2019)
Dobell, W. M.  1986.  “Updating Duverger's Law.”  Canadian Journal of Political 
Science 19(3):  585-95.
Donkin, Karissa.  2018.  “People's Alliance wins 3 seats in 'significant breakthrough'.”  
CBC New Brunswick (Fredericton, NB), September 24.  
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/new-brunswick/peoples-alliance-election-night-
1.4835299 (accessed May 6, 2019).
Duverger, Maurice.  1955.  Political Parties.  London:  Methuen & Co. Ltd.
Dunleavy, Patrick.  2012.  “Duverger's Law is a dead parrot.  European political scientists 
need to recognize that plurality or majority voting has not tendency at all to 
produce two party politics.”  London School of Economics and Politics Blog, June 
20.  https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/06/20/duvergers-law-is-dead/ 
(accessed June 12, 2019).
Dunn, Christopher, ed., Provinces, 3rd Edition.  2016.  Toronto, ON:  University of 
Toronto Press.
Earle, Michael, and H. Gamberg.  1989.  “The United Mine Workers and the Coming of 
the CCF to Cape Breton.”  Acadiensis 19(1):  3-26.
Erickson, Lynda.  1995.  “The October 1993 Election and the Canadian Party System.”  
Party Politics 1(1):  133-43.
Fraser, Elizabeth.  2018.  “David Coon will head back to house with 2 other Green 
MLAs.”  CBC New Brunswick (Fredericton, NB), September 24.  
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/new-brunswick/green-party-new-brunswick-
election-1.4835192 (accessed May 6, 2019).
Fraser, Sara.  2017.  “Green's Hannah Bell wins District 11 byelection by 157 votes.”  
CBC Prince Edward Island (Charlottetown, PEI), November 27.  
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/prince-edward-island/pei-district-11-win-
byelection-polls-polling-station-eastlink-centre-1.4421127 (accessed May 6, 
2019).
112
Gaines, Brian J.  1997.  “Where to Count Parties.”  Electoral Studies 16(1):  49-58.
Gaines, Brian J.  1999.  “Duverger's Law and the Meaning of Canadian Exceptionalism.”  
Comparative Political Studies 32(7): 835-61.
Gerring, John.  2005.  “Minor Parties in Plurality Electoral Systems.”  Party Politics 
11(1):  79-107.
Grenier, Éric.  2015.  “Post-election polls suggest reasons behind Trudeau win.”  CBC 
News (Ottawa, ON), October 23.  https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/grenier-
election-poll-change-oct24-1.3286044 (accessed June 13, 2019).
Golosov, Grigorii V.  2010. “The Effective Number of Parties:  A New Approach.”  Party  
Politics 16(2):  171-92.
Harris, Michael.  1981. “Official party status lost; N.S. NDP leader faces lonely road.”  
The Globe and Mail (Toronto), October 20:  P10.
Henderson, T. Stephen.  2008.  “Nova Scotia's Liberal Patronage System in the 1930s.”  
Journal of the Royal Nova Scotia Historical Society 11:  89-109.
Hirano, Shigeo, and James M. Snyder, Jr.  2007.  “The Decline of Third-Party Voting in 
the United States.”  The Journal of Politics 69(1):  1-16.
Howell, Colin D.  1978.  “The Maritimes and Canadian Political Culture.”  Acadiensis 
8(1):  107-14.
Howell, Colin D.  1979.  “W. S. Fielding and the Repeal Elections of 1886 and 1887 in 
Nova Scotia.”  Acadiensis 8(2):  28-46.
Hutchings, Aaron.  2019.  “Think voting isn't worth it?  Take a look at the results in 
Labrador.”  Maclean's (Toronto), June 7.  
https://www.macleans.ca/news/canada/newfoundland-labrador-election-results-
voting/ (accessed June 13, 2019).
Hyson, Stewart.  1973.  “An Analysis of Party Systems.”  In Provincial Government and 
Politics, ed. Donald C. Rowat.  Ottawa, ON:  Dept. of Political Science, Carleton 
University.
Hyson, Stewart.  1995.  “The Electoral Boundary Revolution in the Maritime Provinces.” 
American Review of Canadian Studies 25(2):  285-99.
Hyson, Stewart.  1999.  “Nova Scotia and the 'Problem' of Minority Government.”  
Canadian Parliamentary Review 21(4):  11-15.
Jenson, Jane.  1976.  “Party Systems.”  In The Provincial Political Systems, eds. David J. 
Bellamy, Jon H. Pammett, and Donald C. Rowat.  Agincourt, ON:  Methuen 
Publications.
Johnston, Richard, and Fred Cutler.  2009.  “Canada:  The Puzzle of Local Three-Party 
Competition*.”  In Duverger's Law of Plurality Voting, eds. Bernard Grofman, 
André Blais, and Shaun Bowler.  New York, NY:  Springer Science+Business 
Media.
Johnston, Richard.  2013.  “Situating the Canadian Case.”  In Parties, Elections, and the 
Future of Canadian Politics, eds. Amanda Bittner and Royce Koop.  Vancouver, 
BC:  UBC Press.
Kenny, James L.  1999.  “Political Culture in Fin-de-Siècle Atlantic Canada.”  Acadiensis  
29(1):  122-37.
113
Kimber, Stephen.  2009.  “Who is premier Darrell Dexter?”  The Coast (Halifax, NS), 
June 4.  https://www.thecoast.ca/halifax/who-is-premier-darrell-dexter/Content?
oid=1135401 (accessed July 28, 2019).
Laakso, Markku, and Rein Taagepera.  1979.  “'Effective' Number of Parties:  A Measure 
with Application to West Europe.”  Comparative Political Studies 12(1):  3-27.
Laroche, Jean.  2019.  “Tories take Sackville—Cobequid by-election in political 
landscape shakeup.”  CBC Nova Scotia (Halifax, NS), June 19.  
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-scotia/sackville-cobequid-2019-byelection-
results-lara-fawthrop-steve-craig-1.5180560 (accessed July 28, 2019).
Laxer, James.  1995.  “McDonough brings gritty resilience to NDP race.”  The Toronto 
Star (Toronto), August 27:  F3.
Lijphart, Arend.  1990.  “The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, 1945-85.”  
American Political Science Review 84(2):  481-96.
MacEachern, Daniel.  2019.  “Exuberant NDP celebrates 'new era' as it holds St. John's 
seats, and wins back Labrador West.”  CBC Newfoundland and Labrador (St. 
John's, NL), May 16.  https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/newfoundland-
labrador/ndp-three-seats-1.5139681 (accessed June 13, 2019).
MacLeod, Jeffrey.  2006.  “Nova Scotia Politics:  Clientelism and John Savage.”  
Canadian Journal of Political Science 39(3):  553-70.
Madill, Dale.  1998.  “IT'S A TIE!”  The Chronicle-Herald (Halifax, NS), March 25.
Mair, Peter.  1997.  Party System Change:  Approaches and Interpretations.  Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press.
Martin, Geoffrey R.  1998.  “We've Seen it All Before:  The Rise and Fall of the COR 
Party of New Brunswick, 1988-1995.”  Journal of Canadian Studies 33(1):  22-
38.
McDonough, Alexa.  2006.  “Women and Politics.”  Our Times 25(1):  40.
McGrane, David.  2008.  “The 2007 Provincial Election in Saskatchewan.”  Canadian 
Political Science Review 2(1):  64-71.
Mildenberger, Matto.  2019.  “Why a Green Wave Could Spread Across Canada.”  The 
Tyee (Vancouver, BC), May 1.  https://thetyee.ca/Opinion/2019/05/01/Green-
Wave-Across-Canada/ (accessed June 13, 2019).
Molinar, Juan.  1991.  “Counting the Number of Parties:  An Alternative Index.”  
American Political Science Review 85(4):  1383-91.
Neto, Octavio Amorim, and Gary W. Cox.  1997.  “Electoral Institutions, Cleavage 
Structures, and the Number of Parties.”  American Journal of Political Science 
Norman, Doug.  1973.  “Regional and Provincial Political Cultures.”  In Provincial 
Government and Politics, ed. Donald C. Rowat.  Ottawa, ON:  Dept. of Political 
Science, Carleton University.
Nova Scotia.  Elections Nova Scotia.  2011.  Nova Scotia Provincial Elections, 1867-
2010.  Halifax, NS:  Elections Nova Scotia.
Nova Scotia.  Elections Nova Scotia.  2018.  Nova Scotia Provincial Elections, 1867-
2017.  Halifax, NS:  Elections Nova Scotia.
Nova Scotia.  Legislature.  1934.  Returns of General Election for the House of Assembly. 
Halifax, NS:  King's Printer.
114
Nwokora, Zim, and Riccardo Pelizzo.  2017.  “Measuring Party System Change:  A 
Systems Perspective.”  Political Studies 66(1):  100-18.
O'Neill, Brenda, and Lynda Erickson.  2003.  “Evaluating Traditionalism in the Atlantic 
Provinces:  Voting, Public Opinion and the Electoral Project.”  Atlantis 27(2):  
113-22.
Park, MyoungHo.  2003.  “Subnational Elections and the Degree of Multipartism in 
Parliamentary Elections:  Evidence from the Canadian Case.”  The Korean 
Journal of International Relations 43(5):  183-201.
Pedersen, Mogens N.  1980.  “On Measuring Party System Change:  A Methodological 
Critique and a Suggestion.”  Comparative Political Studies 12(4):  387-403.
Pinard, Maurice.  1975.  The Rise of a Third Party:  A Study in Crisis Politics.  Montreal, 
QC:  McGill-Queen's University Press.
Pinard, Maurice, and Richard Hamilton.  1978.  “The Parti Québécois Comes to Power:  
An Analysis of the 1976 Quebec Election.”  Canadian Journal of Political 
Science 11(4):  739-75.
Pond, David.  2008.  “Legislative Oversight of Political Patronage in Canada.”  
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 46(3):  365-87.
Prentiss, Mairin.  2019.  “Former NDP MLA Lenore Zann wins federal Liberal 
nomination.”  CBC Nova Scotia (Halifax, NS), July 28.  
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-scotia/former-ndp-mla-lenore-zann-wins-
federal-liberal-nomination-1.5228097 (accessed July 28, 2019).
Press, Jordan.  2015.  “Close results in dozens of ridings mark strategic voting:  
observers.”  CTV News (Toronto), October 20.  
https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/election/close-results-in-dozens-of-ridings-mark-
strategic-voting-observers-1.2619546 (accessed June 13, 2019).
Quinn, Thomas.  2012.  “From Two-Partism to Alternating Predominance:  The Changing 
UK Party System, 1950-2010.”  Political Studies 61(2):  378-400.
Rae, Douglas W.  1967.  The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws.  New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press.
Rayner, Jeremy, and Tina Beaudry-Mellor.  2009.  “Hope and Fear Revisited:  A 
Contextual Explanation of the 2007 Saskatchewan Provincial Election.”  
Canadian Political Science Review 3(1):  17-33.
Riker, William H.  1982.  “The Two-Party System and Duverger's Law:  An Essay on the 
History of Political Science.”  American Political Science Review 76(4):  753-66.
Robin, Martin, ed., Canadian Provincial Politics:  The Party Systems of the Ten 
Provinces.  1972.  Scarborough, ON:  Prentice-Hall.
Robin, Martin, ed., Canadian Provincial Politics (2nd Edition).  1978.  Scarborough, ON:  
Prentice-Hall.
Rowat, Donald C., ed., Provincial Government and Politics.  1973.  Ottawa, ON:  Dept. 
of Political Science, Carleton University.
Sartori, Giovanni.  2005.  Parties and Party Systems.  Colchester, UK:  ECPR Press.
Schwartz, Daniel.  2015.  “Going deeper into Canada's 2015 federal election results.”  
CBC News (Ottawa, ON), October 21.  https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-
election-2015-numbers-1.3281210 (accessed June 12, 2019).
115
Sheppard, Robert.  1994.  “Alexa McDonough steps down.”  The Globe and Mail 
(Toronto), November 28:  A15.
Smith, Jennifer, and Lori Turnbull.  2008.  “The Nova Scotia House of Assembly:  On the 
Cusp of Change?”  Discussion paper series on provincial and territorial 
legislatures.  Canadian Study of Parliament Group.
Smith, Nathaniel, and Janet Guildford.  2011.  “'Writing my memoirs depressed me:  
Florence E. Welton and the CCF in Nova Scotia.”  Journal of the Royal Nova 
Scotia Historical Society 14:  1-21.
Smyth, Mike.  2019.  “NDP romp to crucial byelection win as Green vote collapses.”  
The Province (Vancouver, BC), January 31.  https://theprovince.com/news/bc-
politics/mike-smyth-ndp-romped-to-crucial-win-as-green-vote-collapsed 
(accessed June 14, 2019).
Spafford, Duff.  1981.  “Highway Employment and Provincial Elections.”  Canadian 
Journal of Political Science 14(1):  135-42.
Statistics Canada.  2017.  Nova Scotia [Province] and Canada [Country] (table).  Census  
Profile.  2016 Census.  Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 98-316-X2016001.  
Ottawa.  Released November 29, 2017.
https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2016/dp-pd/prof/index.cfm?
Lang=E  (accessed June 17, 2019).
Stewart, David K., and R. K. Carty.  1993.  “Does Changing the Party Leader Provide an 
Electoral Boost?  A Study of Canadian Provincial Parties:  1960-1992.”  
Canadian Journal of Political Science 26(2):  313-30.
Stewart, David K., Anthony Sayers, and R. K. Carty.  2016.  “Partisan Competition in the 
Canadian Provinces.”  In Provinces, 3rd Edition, ed. Christopher Dunn.  Toronto, 
ON:  University of Toronto Press.
Storring, Thomas.  2015.  Nova Scotia.  Population Changes by Census Division, 1976-
2014.  Halifax, NS:  Department of Finance and Treasury Board, Economics and 
Statistics Division.  
https://www.novascotia.ca/finance/statistics/archive_news.asp?
id=10641&dg=&df=&dto=0&dti=3 (accessed August 2, 2019).
Swick, David.  1997.  “Outside metro and Cape Breton, Tories strong:  Byelection 
suggests PCs likely to do well in province's rural mainland.”  The Daily News 
(Halifax, NS), November 7:  2.
Taagepera, Rein, and Bernard Grofman.  1985.  “Rethinking Duverger's Law:  Predicting 
the Effective Number of Parties in Plurality and PR Systems – Parties Minus 
Issues Equals One*.”  European Journal of Political Research 13:  341-52.
Taagepera, Rein.  1997.  “Effective Number of Parties for Incomplete Data.”  Electoral  
Studies 16(2):  145-51.
Taagepera,  Rein.  1999.  “Supplementing the effective number of parties.”  Electoral  
Studies 18:  497-504.
Turnbull,  Lori.   2007.   “The  2006  Provincial  Election  in  Nova  Scotia.”   Canadian 
Political Science Review 1(2):  63-68.
Turnbull,  Lori.   2009.   “The  Nova  Scotia  Provincial  Election  of  2009.”   Canadian 
Political Science Review 3(3):  69-76.
116
User:Svgalbertian.  2010.  File:Flag-map of Nova Scotia.svg (cover image).  Wikimedia 
Commons.  https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Flag-
map_of_Nova_Scotia.svg (accessed August 10, 2017).
Ware, Alan.  1996.  Political Parties and Party Systems.  Oxford, UK:  Oxford University 
Press.
Wesley, Jared J.  2015.  “The Once-Forgotten Battlegrounds:  Studying Provincial 
Elections in Canada.”  Canadian Political Science Review 9(1):  1-13.
Wesley, Jared J., ed., Big Worlds:  Politics and Elections in the Canadian Provinces and 
Territories.  2016.  Toronto, ON:  University of Toronto Press.
Whitehorn, Alan.  1997.  “Alexa McDonough and Atlantic Breakthrough for the New 
Democratic Party.”  In The Canadian General Election of 1997, eds. Alan Frizzell 
and Jon H. Pammett.  Toronto, ON:  Dundurn Press.
Wolinetz, Steven B.  1988.  Parties and Party Systems in Liberal Democracies.  London, 
UK:  Routledge.
Wolinetz, Steven B.  2006.  “Party systems and party system types.”  In Handbook of 
Party Politics, eds. Richard S. Katz and William Crotty.  London, UK:  Sage 
Publications.
Yaffe, Barbara.  1980.  “Caustic Cape Bretoner a pariah in NDP.”  The Globe and Mail 
(Toronto), June 6:  P11.
Yaffe, Barbara.  1980.  “Nova Scotia MLA threatens to establish alternate NDP.”  The 




NOVA SCOTIA PROVINCIAL GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS
Year
LPNS NSNDP PCNS Other Independent Valid 
VotesS V % S V % S V % S V % S V %
1933 22 166,170 52.6 2,336 0.7 8 145,107 45.9 2,469 0.8 – 316,082
1937 25 165,397 52.9 – 5 143,670 46 3,396 1.1 – 312,463
1941 23 138,915 52.7 3 18,583 7.1 4 106,133 40.3 – – 263,631
1945 28 153,503 52.7 2 39,637 13.6 97,744 33.5 – 530 0.2 291,414
1949 27 174,966 51.1 2 35,449 10.3 8 132,325 38.6 – – 342,740
1953 23 169,927 49.1 2 23,830 6.9 12 149,979 43.4 – 2,065 0.6 345,801
1956 18 159,656 48.2 1 9,932 3 24 161,016 48.6 – 812 0.3 331,416
1960 15 147,951 42.6 1 31,036 8.9 27 168,023 48.3 – 650 0.2 347,660
1963 4 134,923 39.7 14,076 4.1 39 191,128 56.2 – – 340,127
1967 6 142,945 41.8 17,873 5.2 40 180,498 52.8 – 498 0.2 341,814
1970 23 174,943 46.1 2 25,259 6.7 21 177,987 46.9 – 1,464 0.4 379,653
1974 31 206,648 47.9 3 55,902 13 12 166,388 38.6 – 2,220 0.5 431,158
1978 17 175,218 39.4 4 63,979 14.4 31 203,500 45.8 – 2,008 0.5 444,705
1981 13 139,604 33.2 1 76,289 18.1 37 200,228 47.6 – 1 5,002 1.2 421,123
1984 6 129,310 31.3 3 65,876 15.9 42 209,298 50.6 1 8,322 2.0 630 0.2 413,436
1988 21 186,007 39.6 2 74,038 15.8 28 204,150 43.5 – 1 5,638 1.2 469,833
1993 40 243,298 49.7 3 86,743 17.7 9 152,383 31.1 1,647 0.3 5,758 1.2 489,829
1998 19 158,380 35.3 19 155,361 34.6 14 133,540 29.8 – 1,325 0.3 448,606
1999 11 129,108 29.9 11 129,384 29.9 30 169,984 39.3 3,039 0.7 605 0.1 432,120
2003 12 128,417 31.5 15 126,479 31 25 148,182 36.3 3,245 0.8 1,694 0.4 408,017
2006 9 94,872 23.4 20 140,128 34.6 23 160,119 39.6 9,411 2.3 153 0.0 404,683
2009 11 112,160 27.2 31 186,556 45.2 10 101,203 24.5 9,636 2.3 2,796 0.7 412,351
2013 33 190,112 45.7 7 111,622 26.8 11 109,452 26.3 3,528 0.9 1,238 0.3 415,952
2017 27 158,383 39.5 7 86,299 21.5 17 143,354 35.7 12,759 3.2 447 0.1 401,242
Headings:  S – Seats won; V – Votes received; % – Share of the popular vote
Source:  Nova Scotia.  Elections Nova Scotia.  2018.  Summary of Results, 1867 – 2017.  Halifax, NS:  
Elections Nova Scotia.  https://www.electionsnovascotia.ca/sites/default/files/Elections1867to2017.pdf 
(accessed July 30, 2019).
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TABLE 4.2
EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF PARTIES IN NOVA SCOTIA
ELECTION DATE
ENEP ENPP
Golosov Laakso-Taagepera Golosov Laakso-Taagepera
22 August 1933 1.93 2.05 1.36 1.64
29 June 1937 1.91 2.03 1.2 1.38
28 October 1941 1.98 2.25 1.34 1.62
23 October 1945 2.02 2.45 1.07 1.14
9 June 1949 2.07 2.38 1.4 1.72
26 May 1953 2.14 2.3 1.66 2.02
30 October 1956 2.12 2.13 1.82 2.05
7 June 1960 2.18 2.37 1.62 1.94
8 October 1963 1.83 2.11 1.1 1.2
30 May 1967 1.97 2.19 1.15 1.29
13 October 1970 2.28 2.29 2.07 2.17
2 April 1974 2.23 2.53 1.53 1.9
19 September 1978 2.33 2.59 1.75 2.14
6 October 1981 2.27 2.71 1.43 1.76
6 November 1984 2.15 2.63 1.26 1.49
6 September 1988 2.47 2.7 1.94 2.2
25 May 1993 2.18 2.67 1.32 1.6
24 March 1998 2.9 3 2.82 2.95
27 July 1999 2.69 3 1.85 2.37
5 August 2003 2.89 3.03 2.23 2.72
13 June 2006 2.73 3.01 2.4 2.68
9 June 2009 2.44 2.95 1.78 2.29
8 October 2013 2.37 2.86 1.62 2.07
30 May 2017 2.77 3.03 2.01 2.44
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TABLE 4.3
EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF ELECTORAL PARTIES IN PROVINCIAL RIDINGS
ELECTION 
YEAR
GOLOSOV INDEX LAAKSO-TAAGEPERA INDEX
Average Median Deviation Average Median Deviation
1933 1.92 1.87 0.24 2.06 1.99 0.23
1937 1.83 1.81 0.18 2.01 1.98 0.19
1941 1.85 1.71 0.34 2.07 1.94 0.34
1945 1.9 1.84 0.32 2.22 2.22 0.34
1949 2 1.98 0.28 2.24 2.18 0.33
1953 1.97 1.95 0.2 2.17 2.01 0.27
1956 1.96 1.93 0.23 2.09 2 0.3
1960 2.07 2.05 0.22 2.25 2.14 0.26
1963 1.81 1.83 0.15 2.04 1.99 0.17
1967 1.92 1.92 0.19 2.13 2.04 0.21
1970 1.99 1.95 0.18 2.18 2.13 0.22
1974 2.07 2.08 0.25 2.37 2.39 0.23
1978 2.07 2.02 0.26 2.4 2.33 0.24
1981 2.15 2.13 0.3 2.52 2.51 0.26
1984 2.03 2.05 0.29 2.39 2.36 0.27
1988 2.19 2.14 0.34 2.5 2.45 0.29
1993 2.16 2.23 0.5 2.49 2.5 0.47
1998 2.31 2.34 0.36 2.67 2.78 0.3
1999 2.27 2.35 0.41 2.64 2.73 0.37
2003 2.32 2.36 0.4 2.69 2.74 0.33
2006 2.2 2.21 0.39 2.59 2.69 0.35
2009 2.05 2 0.43 2.47 2.5 0.42
2013 2.26 2.33 0.45 2.58 2.65 0.42
2017 2.31 2.38 0.43 2.69 2.81 0.4
TABLE 4.4
EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF ELECTORAL PARTIES IN PROVINCIAL RIDINGS (3 ERAS)
ELECTION 
YEARS
GOLOSOV INDEX LAAKSO-TAAGEPERA INDEX
Average Median Deviation Average Median Deviation
1933-1970 1.94 1.92 0.24 2.13 2 0.27
1974-1993 2.11 2.08 0.34 2.45 2.4 0.31
1998-2017 2.24 2.3 0.42 2.62 2.69 0.37
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TABLE 4.5
RAE'S FRACTIONALIZATION INDEX FOR NOVA SCOTIA



























SARTORI COUNT OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN NOVA SCOTIA
ELECTION SEATS CONFIDENCE SUPERFLUOUS RELEVANCE TOTAL
1933 2 2
1937 2 2
1941 3 1 3
1945 2 1 3
1949 3 1 3
1953 3 -1 2
1956 3 -1 2
1960 3 -1 2
1963 2 2
1967 2 2
1970 3 1 3
1974 3 1 3
1978 3 1 3
1981 4 -1 3
1984 4 -1 3
1988 4 -1 3
1993 3 1 3
1998 3 2 3
1999 3 1 3
2003 3 2 3
2006 3 2 3
2009 3 1 3
2013 3 1 3
2017 3 1 3
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TABLE 4.7
COMBINED VOTE SHARE OF TWO LARGEST PARTIES































VOTE SHARE (%) RELATIVE PROPORTION
FIRST SECOND THIRD FIRST SECOND THIRD
1933 52.57 45.91 0.78 67.3 58.77 1
1937 52.93 45.98 1.09 48.7 42.31 1
1941 52.69 40.26 7.05 7.48 5.71 1
1945 52.68 33.54 13.6 3.87 2.47 1
1949 51.05 38.61 10.34 4.94 3.73 1
1953 49.14 43.37 6.89 7.13 6.29 1
1956 48.58 48.17 3 16.21 16.07 1
1960 48.33 42.56 8.93 5.41 4.77 1
1963 56.19 39.67 4.14 13.58 9.59 1
1967 52.81 41.82 5.23 10.1 8 1
1970 46.88 46.08 6.65 7.05 6.93 1
1974 47.93 38.59 12.97 3.7 2.98 1
1978 45.76 39.4 14.39 3.18 2.74 1
1981 47.55 33.15 18.12 2.62 1.83 1
1984 50.62 31.28 15.93 3.18 1.96 1
1988 43.45 39.59 15.76 2.76 2.51 1
1993 49.67 31.11 17.71 2.8 1.76 1
1998 35.3 34.63 29.77 1.19 1.16 1
1999 39.34 29.94 29.88 1.32 1 1
2003 36.32 31.47 31 1.17 1.02 1
2006 39.57 34.63 23.44 1.69 1.48 1
2009 45.24 27.2 24.54 1.84 1.11 1
2013 45.71 26.84 26.31 1.74 1.02 1
2017 39.47 35.73 21.51 1.84 1.66 1
